Reconsidering Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets by Corgnet, Brice et al.
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
ESI Working Papers Economic Science Institute
4-2019
Reconsidering Rational Expectations and the
Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory
Security Markets
Brice Corgnet
Emlyon Business School
Cary Deck
Chapman University, deck@chapman.edu
Mark DeSantis
Chapman University, desantis@chapman.edu
Kyle Hampton
Chapman University
Erik O. Kimbrough
Chapman University, ekimbrou@chapman.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers
Part of the Econometrics Commons, Economic Theory Commons, and the Other Economics
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in ESI Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Corgnet, B., Deck, C., DeSantis, M., Hampton, K., Kimbrough, E.O. (2019). Reconsidering rational expectations and the aggregation
of diverse information in laboratory security markets. ESI Working Paper 19-11. Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/269/
Reconsidering Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse
Information in Laboratory Security Markets
Comments
Working Paper 19-11
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/269
	 	 	
	
1	
	
Reconsidering	Rational	Expectations	and	the	Aggregation	of	Diverse	Information		
in	Laboratory	Security	Markets	
	
Brice	Corgnet	 Cary	Deck	 Mark	DeSantis	 Kyle	Hampton	 Erik	O.	Kimbrough	
Emlyon	Business	
School	
University	of	
Alabama	&		
Chapman	
University	
Chapman	
University	
Chapman	
University	
Chapman	
University	
	
April	2019	
	
Abstract	
The	 ability	 of	 markets	 to	 aggregate	 diverse	 information	 is	 a	 cornerstone	 of	 economics	 and	
finance,	 and	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 such	 aggregation	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 in	 previous	
laboratory	 experiments.	 	 Most	 notably	 Plott	 and	 Sunder	 (1988)	 find	 clear	 support	 for	 the	
rational	expectations	hypothesis	in	their	Series	B	and	C	markets.		However,	recent	studies	have	
called	 into	question	the	robustness	of	these	findings.	 	 In	this	paper,	we	report	the	result	of	a	
direct	replication	of	the	key	information	aggregation	results	presented	in	Plott	and	Sunder.		We	
do	not	find	the	same	strong	evidence	in	support	of	rational	expectations	that	Plott	and	Sunder	
report	suggesting	information	aggregation	is	a	fragile	property	of	markets.						
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1.	Introduction	
The	ability	of	markets	to	aggregate	dispersed	information	has	long	played	a	critical	role	in	the	
debate	over	the	optimal	allocation	of	scarce	resources	in	Economics.	Hayek	(1945)	was	the	first	
to	emphasize	the	capacity	of	markets	as	a	mechanism	to	aggregate	and	convey	highly-dispersed	
information	to	the	rest	of	society	via	prices.	Although	most	economists	are	sympathetic	to	the	
Hayekian	argument,	 the	ongoing	debate	between	classical	 and	behavioral	 finance	 testifies	 to	
the	 existence	 of	 open	 disagreements	 regarding	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 efficient	 markets	
hypothesis	holds	 in	practice,	 i.e.,	 the	extent	 to	which	market	prices	 tend	to	accurately	 reflect	
available	 information	 (Fama,	 1970;	 Fama,	 2008;	 Shleifer,	 2000;	 Thaler,	 2005,	 2015;	 Shiller,	
2015).	 This	 debate	 is	 fueled	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 a	 widely-accepted	methodology	 to	 gauge	 whether	
naturally	occurring	markets	are	indeed	efficient.	Fama	(1991)	argues	that	“market	efficiency	per	
se	is	not	testable”	(p.	1575).	In	the	field,	this	is	the	case	because	private	information	is	largely	
unobserved	and	because	not	all	finance	scholars	agree	on	which	asset	pricing	model	should	be	
used	to	assess	whether	a	given	piece	of	information	is	reflected	in	prices.	These	considerations	
would	seem	to	imply	that	the	efficient	markets	hypothesis	(Fama,	1970)	is	not	falsifiable.	
However,	 the	emergence	of	 experimental	markets	 (Chamberlain,	 1948;	 Smith,	 1962)	made	 it	
possible	for	economists	to	construct	markets	in	which	they	would	not	only	have	perfect	control	
over	the	distribution	of	private	information	but	also	know	the	fundamental	value	of	any	asset	
(e.g.	Bossaerts,	2009;	Frydman	et	al.	2014;	Noussair	and	Tucker,	2013).	Experimental	markets	
could	 thus	 allow	 researchers	 to	 study	 the	 aggregation	 of	 private	 information,	 rendering	 the	
efficient	markets	hypothesis	falsifiable.	This	methodological	breakthrough	was	initiated	by	Plott	
and	Sunder	(1988),	hereafter	P&S,	who	designed	experimental	markets	to	gauge	the	extent	to	
which	 dispersed	 private	 information	 was	 incorporated	 into	 prices.	 In	 their	 design,	 subjects	
traded	assets	that	delivered	one	of	three	possible	dividends	at	the	end	of	each	market	period	
based	 on	 a	 randomly	 determined	 state	 (X,	 Y,	 or	 Z).	 Each	 trader	 was	 endowed	 with	 private	
information	ruling	out	one	of	the	possible	states	(e.g.	Not	X).	Because	P&S	made	sure	half	the	
traders	were	given	one	piece	of	information,	while	the	other	half	were	told	the	complementary	
piece	of	information	(e.g.	half	told	not	X	and	half	told	Not	Y),	the	aggregate	information	held	by	
market	 participants	was	 complete	 (e.g.	 the	 state	must	 be	 Z).	 They	 reported	 strong	 evidence	
that,	in	line	with	the	efficient	markets	hypothesis,	market	prices	can	reflect	the	true	asset	value	
if	there	are	contingent	markets	for	each	possible	state	(referred	to	in	P&S	as	Series	B)	or	if	there	
is	a	single	asset	yielding	common	state-specific	dividends	to	all	 traders	 (referred	to	 in	P&S	as	
Series	 C).	 	 An	 equally	 important,	 but	 oft-ignored	 finding	 of	 P&S,	 is	 the	 fragility	 of	 successful	
information	aggregation.	 	P&S	(p.	1117)	highlight	this	 in	their	conclusion	when	they	point	out	
that	“not	all	markets	can	be	depended	upon	to	behave	in	accord	with	the	rational	expectations	
model.”	 	 In	 particular,	 P&S	 found	 that	markets	 with	 a	 single	 asset	 but	 diverse	 state-specific	
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dividends	 (referred	 to	 in	 P&S	 as	 Series	 A)	 do	 not	 yield	 prices	 consistent	 with	 the	 rational	
expectations	model.1				
The	positive	results	of	P&S	have	been	highly	influential,	serving	as	the	basis	for	a	wide	variety	of	
extensions	 and	 applications,	 which	 were	 followed	 by	 a	 wave	 of	 field	 studies	 discussing	 the	
successful	 use	 of	 prediction	 markets	 at	 major	 companies	 such	 as	 Hewlett-Packard,	 Intel,	
Google,	Microsoft,	Yahoo	and	IBM	(Chen	and	Plott,	2002;	Cowgill,	Wolfers	and	Zitzewitz	2009;	
Gillen,	Plott	and	Shum,	2017;	see	Deck	and	Porter	2013	for	a	survey).		Prediction	markets	have	
come	to	be	viewed	as	a	mainstream	tool	for	decision	makers	wanting	to	aggregate	information	
(See	Arrow	et	al.	2008).			
Despite	these	encouraging	results,	evidence	from	a	number	of	recent	experimental	studies	has	
cast	doubt	on	the	robustness	of	the	market’s	ability	to	aggregate	dispersed	private	information	
even	 in	 the	 cases	where	P&S	 found	 success.	 	 Several	works	using	 variants	of	 the	P&S	design	
with	a	 single	asset	 (Series	C)	have	 reported	substantial	mispricing	 (see	Biais,	Hilton,	Mazurier	
and	Pouget,	2005;	Hanson,	Oprea	and	Porter	2006;	Veiga	and	Vorsatz	2010;	Corgnet,	DeSantis	
and	 Porter,	 2015;	 2019).	 Similarly,	 Page	 and	 Siemroth	 (2018)	 report	 a	 failure	 to	 aggregate	
private	information	in	contingent	claims	markets,	though	their	setup	differed	from	P&S	(Series	
B),	 as	 they	 studied	 the	more	 intricate	 case	of	 aggregate	uncertainty	 (see	Anderson	and	Holt,	
1997)	in	which	all	private	signals	available	in	the	market	cannot	fully	reveal	the	true	value	of	the	
asset.2	Finally,	mispricing	has	also	been	observed	in	setups	which	allow	for	costly	acquisition	of	
private	information	(e.g.	Huber,	Angerer	and	Kirchler,	2011;	Page	and	Siemroth,	2017;	Corgnet,	
Deck,	DeSantis	and	Porter	2018).	
Despite	the	seemingly	contradictory	evidence,	no	experimental	work	has	attempted	to	directly	
replicate	the	findings	of	P&S.	Instead,	previous	works	have	modified	the	original	P&S	design	in	
potentially	important	ways,	confounding	direct	comparisons	to	P&S.	For	example,	the	works	of	
Hanson,	 Oprea	 and	 Porter	 (2006),	 Veiga	 and	 Vorsatz	 (2010),	 Page	 and	 Siemroth	 (2018)	 and	
Corgnet,	DeSantis	and	Porter	(2015;	2019)	used	computerized	auctions	instead	of	hand-run	oral	
auctions.	Although	Biais,	Hilton,	Mazurier	and	Pouget	(2005)	use	oral	auctions,	their	procedures	
differ	from	P&S	because	their	continuous	double	auctions	were	either	preceded	or	followed	by	
a	 call	 auction.	 In	 addition,	 no	 work	 in	 this	 literature	 has	 used	 the	markets	 reported	 in	 P&S	
(Series	B)	in	which	the	value	of	dividends	is	heterogenous	across	traders.		
Given	 the	 current	 state	 of	 the	 literature	 and	 practice,	 we	 believe	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 revisit	 the	
question	of	 information	aggregation.	To	 that	end,	we	conducted	a	 replication	of	 the	work	of	
																																								 																				
1	A	follow-up	study	by	Forsythe	and	Lundholm	(1990)	showed	that	full	information	aggregation	could	be	achieved	
when	 the	 same	 cohort	 of	 subjects	 were	 re-invited	 for	 a	 second	 trading	 session	 where	 the	 distribution	 of	
heterogeneous	dividend	values	of	the	single	asset	was	common	knowledge	among	all	traders.	
2	Page	and	Siemroth	(2018)	consider	a	common	dividend	value	environment.	
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P&S	so	as	to	gauge	the	robustness	of	their	results	as	well	as	shed	light	on	the	factors	that	might	
promote	or	hinder	the	aggregation	of	diverse	information.	
2.	The	Experiments	of	Plott	and	Sunder	
In	P&S	 traders	are	endowed	with	an	amount	of	money,	denoted	 in	 Francs,	 and	assets	 called	
certificates	that	can	be	bought	and	sold	by	the	traders	using	a	continuous	double	auction.		At	
the	 end	 of	 each	 trading	 period,	 certificates	 pay	 their	 owner	 a	 dividend	 that	 depends	 on	 the	
state	of	nature,	which	can	be	X,	Y,	or	Z.		The	state	of	nature	is	not	known	by	any	trader,	but	the	
probability	 distribution	 over	 states	 is	 common	 information.	 Further,	 half	 the	 traders	 are	
informed	of	 one	unrealized	 state;	while,	 the	other	 half	 are	 informed	of	 the	other	 unrealized	
state.	So	for	example,	if	the	state	is	X,	then	half	the	traders	are	informed	the	state	is	not	Y	and	
half	are	informed	it	is	not	Z.		In	aggregate	the	traders	have	sufficient	information	to	determine	
that	 the	 state	 is	 X.	 	 If	 markets	 successfully	 aggregate	 dispersed	 information,	 then	 the	 price	
should	reflect	the	value	the	traders	have	for	the	certificates	in	the	realized	state.					
P&S	present	the	results	of	11	total	sessions	from	three	series	of	markets.	In	Series	A	markets,	
different	trader	types	had	different	dividend	values	for	each	state	of	nature,	and	there	was	a	
single	asset	trading	in	the	market.	In	Series	B	markets,	as	in	Series	A,	different	types	of	traders	
had	different	dividend	values,	but	there	was	a	complete	set	of	contingent	claims,	each	of	which	
only	 delivered	 a	 payout	 if	 the	 associated	 state	was	 realized.3	 	 Thus,	 the	 difference	 between	
Series	A	and	Series	B	is	the	type	of	asset(s)	–	single	or	contingent	claim	–	that	was	tradable.	In	
Series	C,	dividend	values	were	the	same	for	all	traders,	and	there	was	a	single	tradable	asset.		
The	difference	between	Series	A	and	Series	C	 is	the	diverse	or	common	dividend	value	of	the	
single	asset.		Series	A	is	arguably	the	most	complex	setup	of	the	three;	while,	both	Series	B	and	
Series	 C	 introduce	 simplifications.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 one	 can	 view	 Series	 A	 as	 the	 experimental	
baseline	and	Series	B	and	Series	C	as	treatments.			
In	 P&S,	 the	 information	 aggregation	 hypothesis	 was	 rejected	 whenever	 the	 data	 on	 prices,	
allocation	 and	 profits	 were	 not	 better	 explained	 by	 the	 Rational	 Expectations	 model	 (RE,	
hereafter)	 model	 compared	 to	 two	 alternative	 models:	 Prior	 Information	 and	 Maximin.	 We	
describe	these	models	below.		
Rational	expectations	(RE)	
If	 the	 pooled	 information	 of	 all	 traders	 identifies	 the	 asset	 value	 with	 certainty,	 the	 fully-
revealing	 rational	 expectations	 equilibrium	 price	 is	 the	 true	 asset	 value.	 To	 illustrate	 the	
mechanics,	consider	the	case	in	which	it	is	common	knowledge	that	the	asset	value	is	50,	240,	
or	490	each	with	equal	probability.		Suppose	the	true	value	is	50.	In	this	case,	half	the	traders	
																																								 																				
3	Diverse	dividend	values	ensure	that	there	are	always	gains	from	trade.			
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would	be	given	the	signal	“Not	240”	and	the	other	half	would	be	given	the	signal	“Not	490”.	
Before	any	trading	occurs,	the	traders	who	receive	the	“Not	240”	signal	value	the	asset	at	270;	
whereas,	the	“Not	490”	traders	value	the	asset	at	145.		These	traders	would	also	recognize	that	
should	anyone	have	received	a	“Not	50”	signal	that	trader	would	value	the	asset	at	365.	 	The	
lack	of	traders	willing	to	purchase	the	asset	at	a	price	between	270	and	365	thus	reveals	that	
none	of	the	traders	received	the	“Not	50”	signal.	This	reveals	that	the	true	value	must	be	50,	
and	so	50	would	be	the	equilibrium	price.	
Prior	information	(PI)	
In	the	prior	information	model,	traders	do	not	infer	information	regarding	other	traders’	signals	
from	market	prices,	but	they	do	apply	Bayes’	rule	to	compute	the	expected	asset	value	given	
the	 public	 information	 on	 the	 prior	 probability	 that	 a	 state	 is	 realized	 and	 their	 own	 private	
information	 (Lintner,	 1969).	 	 Each	 individual	 trader	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	willing	 to	 spend	 all	 her	
cash	to	buy	assets	at	a	price	below	her	prior	belief	of	its	value	and	would	sell	all	her	certificates	
at	 any	 price	 above	 her	 prior	 belief.	 	With	 sufficient	 liquidity,	 the	market	 price	will	 equal	 the	
prior	belief	of	the	trader	type	with	the	highest	prior	belief.		Again	using	the	example	where	50,	
240,	and	490	are	equally	likely,	a	trader	who	was	informed	the	value	was	not	50	would	buy	at	
prices	below	365	and	sell	at	prices	higher	than	this.		A	trader	who	was	informed	the	value	was	
not	490	would	buy	at	prices	below	145	and	sell	at	prices	higher	than	this.		Thus,	the	result	when	
the	true	value	is	240	would	be	a	price	of	365.			
Maximin	(MM)	
Similar	to	PI,	market	prices	do	not	reveal	all	available	private	information	in	this	model.	Instead,	
a	trader	is	assumed	to	buy	the	asset	only	when	she	is	certain	that	the	price	is	equal	to	or	below	
the	 minimum	 dividend	 it	 could	 possibly	 yield,	 given	 the	 public	 information	 and	 her	 private	
information.	With	sufficient	 liquidity,	the	market	price	predicted	by	this	model	 is	equal	to	the	
minimum	belief	of	the	trader	type	with	the	highest	belief	of	the	minimum	possible	valuation	of	
the	asset.		Returning	to	the	case	in	which	the	true	value	is	equally	likely	to	be	50,	240,	or	490,	a	
trader	who	is	informed	the	true	value	is	not	50	would	buy	at	any	price	below	240	while	a	trader	
who	is	informed	the	value	is	not	240	would	only	pay	at	most	50.		Thus,	the	price	would	be	240	
when	the	true	value	was	490.	
In	 Series	 A,	 P&S	 rejected	 the	 hypothesis	 that	market	 prices	 aggregated	 private	 information.	
However,	P&S	report	successful	information	aggregation	in	Series	B	and	C	which	is	when	the	RE	
model	outperforms	the	PI	and	MM	models	 in	predicting	prices	(see	Table	III	 in	P&S,	p.	1105),	
certificate	 allocations	 (Table	 IV	 in	 P&S,	 p.	 1106)	 and	 profit	 distributions	 (Table	 V	 in	 P&S,	 p.	
1107).		These	significant	results	are	captured	in	Conclusions	2,	3	and	4	in	P&S.	
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The	authors	note	“The	fact	that	both	the	second	and	third	series	perform	as	predicted	by	the	
RE	model	leads	us	to	suspect	that	the	existence	of	instruments	which	enable	traders	to	link	the	
actions	of	others	to	a	source	of	motivation	is	important	to	the	information	aggregation	function	
of	markets”	 (P&S,	 p.	 1086).	 	 Thus,	 P&S	 suggest	 that	 information	 aggregation	 is	 not	 a	 robust	
property	of	markets,	but	can	occur	under	certain	circumstances.		In	particular,	they	emphasize	
that	the	presence	of	a	full	set	of	contingent	claims	is	crucial	to	transform	an	inefficient	market	
(Series	A)	into	an	efficient	one	(Series	B):	“The	introduction	of	a	complete	set	of	Arrow-Debreu	
securities	 transformed	 a	 market	 that	 was	 operating	 inefficiently	 into	 a	 market	 that	 rapidly	
achieved	a	rational	expectations	equilibrium.”	(P&S,	p.	1117).	
	
3.	Replication	Experiments	
Following	the	replication	procedures	used	by	Camerer	et	al.	2016	(p.	1433),	we	attempted	to	
replicate	the	most	 important	statistically	significant	finding	of	the	original	study.	For	P&S	that	
finding	 is	 that	 information	aggregation	 successfully	occurs	 in	Series	B	and	C	markets.	P&S	 (p.	
1116)	state	“On	the	positive	side,	experiments	in	the	contingent	claims	markets	(Series	B)	and	
in	 the	uniform	dividends	markets	 (Series	C)	 demonstrate	 that	markets	 can	aggregate	diverse	
information	in	a	manner	consistent	with	rational	expectations	models.”	
Our	replication	thus	seeks	to	assess	whether	asset	prices	reveal	all	available	private	information	
in	Series	B	and	C	markets.	Following	P&S,	we	compare	the	predictive	ability	of	the	RE	model	to	
that	 of	 PI	 and	MM.	 	 Our	 replication	 attempt	 was	 preregistered	 in	 the	 AEA	 RCT	 Registry	 as	
AEARCTR-0003660.		
Market	Environment		
The	 parameters	 for	 the	markets	 are	 shown	 in	 Table	 1,	which	 is	 a	 subset	 of	 Table	 I	 (P&S,	 p.	
1088).	We	replicated	Markets	4,	5,	7,	8,	and	9	which	correspond	to	Series	B	and	C.	 	The	only	
change	 from	 P&S	 is	 the	 exchange	 rate	 for	 converting	 lab	 earnings	 into	 cash	 payments.	 	 To	
account	for	the	cost	of	living	difference	in	the	approximately	thirty	years	that	have	transpired	
since	the	original	data	were	collected,	the	dollar	per	franc	exchange	rates	have	been	doubled.4	
Within	 each	 series,	 all	 traders	 in	 a	 session	 started	 with	 the	 same	 endowment	 of	 cash	 and	
certificates	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	 market	 period.	 As	 the	 initial	 endowment	 of	 Francs	
represents	 a	 loan	 from	 the	experimenter,	 traders	had	 to	pay	a	 fixed	 cost	 at	 the	end	of	 each	
market	to	repay	this	loan,	meaning	that	subjects’	earnings	were	driven	solely	by	dividends	and	
																																								 																				
4	The	cost	of	living	has	indeed	doubled	in	the	US	between	1988	and	2018	given	an	average	annual	inflation	rate	of	
2.5%	over	that	period.	Note	that	the	original	experiments	and	our	replication	use	an	experimental	currency	called	
francs	that	is	converted	into	local	currency	at	the	end	of	the	session.		For	most	of	P&S	and	all	of	our	markets,	that	
currency	is	dollars.		However,	Markets	7	and	8	of	P&S	were	conducted	in	India	and	thus	payments	were	converted	
into	rupees.			
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capital	gains/losses.	The	predicted	prices	under	RE,	PI,	and	MM	as	well	as	the	predicted	ending	
allocation	of	certificates	can	be	found	 in	Table	 II	 (P&S,	pp.	1091-1092)	and	are	reproduced	 in	
Appendix	A	for	each	series,	trader	type,	and	realized	state	of	nature.	
Table	1.	Market	Parameters	
Market	
(Series)	
Trader		
Type	
Number	
of	Traders	
Initial	Endowment	 Fixed	
Cost	
$/	
FrancB	
Dividends	 Probabilities	
Certificates	 Francs	 X	 Y	 Z	 X	 Y	 Z	
4	(B)	
I	
II	
III	
4	
4	
4	
2	
2	
2	
10,000	
10,000	
10,000	
10,000	
10,000	
10,000	
0.006	
0.006	
0.006	
70	
230	
100	
130	
		90	
160	
300	
		60	
200	
0.35	 0.20	 0.45	
5	(B)	
I	
II	
III	
4	
4	
4	
2	
2	
2	
15,000	
15,000	
15,000	
15,000	
15,000	
15,000	
0.005	
0.005	
0.005	
140	
460	
200	
260	
180	
320	
600	
120	
400	
1/3	 1/3	 1/3	
7	(C)	 I	 12	 4	 25,000	 25,000	 0.003	 50	 240	 490	 1/3	 1/3	 1/3	
8	(C)	 I	 12	 2	 25,000	 25,000	 0.003	 125	 375	 525	 1/3	 1/3	 1/3	
9	(C)	 I	 12	 4	 25,000	 25,000	 0.003	 50	 240	 490	 0.35	 0.45	 0.20	
The	exchange	rate	reported	in	Table	I	of	P&S	(p.1088)	shows	the	exchange	rate	for	Market	9	was	0.015.		We	believe	this	was	
a	typo	as	otherwise	the	payoffs	for	that	market	are	not	aligned	with	the	payoffs	for	the	other	markets.	
	
Power	and	Sample	Size	
Following	Camerer	et	al.	 (2016),	our	aim	was	 to	ensure	a	statistical	power	of	at	 least	90%	to	
detect	 the	P&S	findings	at	a	5%	significance	 level;	 thus,	we	adopt	 their	method	and	estimate	
the	multiple	of	the	original	sample	size	that	would	be	needed	to	achieve	90%	power	by	using	
the	 standard	 z-test	 power	 formula	 !.!"!! !where	 z	 is	 the	 standard	 normal	 test	 statistic	
associated	with	the	p-value	of	the	original	study.		The	main	statistically	significant	results	of	P&S	
correspond	 to	 the	 comparison	 between	 the	 RE	 model	 and	 the	 other	 two	 models	 regarding	
prices	(P&S,	Table	III)	allocations	(P&S,	Table	IV)	and	profits	(P&S,	Table	V).	Regarding	the	result	
on	prices	and	profits,	the	required	sample	size	is	3.019	times	as	large	as	the	original	sample,	as	
the	 reported	 p-values	 are	 all	 equal	 to	 0.031,	 which	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 z	 statistic	 of	 1.866.		
Regarding	allocations,	the	p-value	is	0.048	so	that	the	multiple	of	the	original	sample	size	that	
would	be	needed	is	equal	to	3.791.	We	thus	opted	for	a	multiple	of	4	and	collected	four	times	
as	much	data	as	the	original	study	in	order	to	have	sufficient	statistical	power.	This	value	falls	
within	 the	 normal	 range	 of	 multiples	 used	 in	 recent	 replication	 attempts	 in	 economics	 and	
social	sciences	(see	Camerer	et	al.	2016;	2018).			We	thus	recruited	a	total	of	144	subjects.5		All	
participants	were	recruited	from	Chapman	University’s	Economic	Science	Institute	subject	pool	
																																								 																				
5	 The	 number	 of	 subjects	 is	 less	 than	 4	 replicates	 x	 5	markets	 x	 12	 traders	 because	Markets	 5	 and	 8	 involved	
experienced	traders	as	discussed	in	the	next	subsection.				
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and	were	undergraduate	 students	 at	 that	 institution	with	no	prior	 experience	 in	 information	
aggregation	markets.	
	
Subject	Experience	and	Earnings	
Because	the	duration	and	required	experience	varied	across	the	markets	in	P&S,	subjects	were	
recruited	 for	different	durations	with	different	participation	payments	and	average	earnings.6		
We	were	also	careful	to	match	the	experience	levels	in	P&S	(see	Table	I,	p.	1088).		In	Market	8,	
the	 subjects	 were	 experienced	 in	 Market	 7.	 In	 P&S	 this	 means	 that	 the	 subjects	 were	
participating	with	 the	 exact	 same	 group	 of	 people	 in	 the	 two	markets,	 since	 there	were	 12	
people	in	each	market,	and	there	was	only	one	replicate	of	each	market.		However,	in	P&S	the	
subjects	 in	Market	5	were	experienced	either	 in	Market	3	or	4.	 	Thus,	our	Market	5	 sessions	
were	formed	by	combining	half	the	subjects	 in	one	Market	4	session	with	half	the	subjects	 in	
another	 Market	 4	 session.	 The	 two	 remaining	 halves	 were	 also	 combined	 into	 a	 separate	
Market	5	session.		Table	2	summarizes	the	details	of	our	experimental	sessions.	
Table	2.		Summary	of	Experimental	Sessions	
P&S	Market	
and	Series	
Experience Subjects	/	
Session 
PeriodsA Sessions Participation	
PaymentB 
DurationC Average	
Earnings	
(USD)D 
4	B	 None	 12	 13	 4	 $7	 210	min	 27.19	
5	B	 Market	4	 12	 9	 4	 $30	 150	min	 33.89	
7	C	 None	 12	 14	 4	 $7	 180	min	 39.78	
8	C	 Market	7	 12	 7	 4	 $27	 120	min	 15.64	
9	C	 None	 12	 17	 4	 $15	 210	min	 53.68	
A	 In	 periods	 10-13	of	Market	 4	 and	 10-16	of	Market	 5,	 traders	 also	 completed	 Series	A	markets	 in	 P&S.	We	 followed	 this	
procedure	 for	 Market	 4,	 although	 we	 are	 not	 interested	 in	 analyzing	 Series	 A	 for	 which	 P&S	 did	 not	 report	 successful	
information	aggregation.	Throughout	the	remainder	of	this	paper,	when	we	refer	to	Market	4	we	mean	the	Series	B	portion	
of	the	market	in	periods	1-9.		We	did	not	complete	periods	10-16	(Series	A	markets)	in	Market	5	as,	unlike	Market	4	traders	
who	 are	 recruited	 to	 participate	 in	Market	 5	 (see	 P&S),	 this	 additional	 experience	 of	 Series	 A	markets	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
experiment	could	not	have	impacted	any	behavior	relevant	to	our	replication	endeavor.	
B	The	participation	payments	for	sessions	of	Markets	5	and	8	were	large	to	ensure	that	subjects	returned	from	Markets	4	and	
7,	respectively	to	ensure	that	we	were	able	to	match	the	experience	levels	of	subjects	in	P&S	(see	Table	I	of	P&S,	p.	1088).	
Markets	7	and	8	were	conducted	on	the	same	day,	with	a	one-hour	lunch	break	in	between.	Markets	4	and	5	were	conducted	
either	1	or	2	days	apart.	For	every	Market	5	session,	two	subjects	with	experience	in	Market	9	were	recruited	as	standbys	in	
case	a	Market	4	subject	did	not	return	for	Market	5.		In	one	Market	5	session	a	single	standby	was	used	as	an	alternate.		To	
further	encourage	the	subjects	to	return	for	the	second	session,	Market	4(7)	earnings	were	not	paid	until	the	end	of	Market	
5(8),	with	subjects	only	receiving	the	participation	payment	at	the	end	of	Market	4(7).				
C	The	duration	denotes	the	length	of	time	for	which	the	participants	were	recruited.		
D	The	earnings	exclude	the	participation	payments.							
																																								 																				
6	The	lab’s	policy	required	that	subjects	be	compensated	in	part	based	upon	study	duration.			
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Procedures	
Conduct	of	each	session	closely	 followed	the	procedures	 laid	out	 in	P&S.	 	P&S	(p.	1118)	note	
that	 steps	 “were	 essentially	 similar	 to	 those	 described	 …	 in	 Plott	 and	 Sunder	 (1982)	 with	
appropriate	 modifications	 to	 the	 instructions…”	 Thus,	 all	 handouts	 and	 instructions	 for	 this	
hand-run	 experiment,	 which	 are	 available	 in	 Appendix	 B,	 are	 based	 on	 details	 in	 Plott	 and	
Sunder	(1982)	and	reflect	differences	that	were	noted	in	P&S	to	the	fullest	degree	possible.	
Each	session	consisted	of	5	stages	after	subjects	provided	informed	consent	and	a	general	script	
was	read	aloud.					
Stage	1.	 	 Subjects	were	 trained	with	 the	mechanism	 (a	bingo	 cage)	used	 to	draw	 the	
state	of	nature.	 In	Plott	 and	Sunder	 (1982,	p.	693),	 it	 is	noted	 that	10-20	draws	were	
completed	 until	most	 subjects	 predicted	 the	most	 likely	 outcome.	 	 In	 our	 replication,	
there	were	always	exactly	10	draws	for	this	training.			
Stage	 2.	 Subjects	were	 trained	with	 the	mechanism	 to	 provide	 signals	 (referred	 to	 as	
clues)	about	the	state	of	nature.	P&S	note	(p.	1118)	that	this	training	lasted	between	8	
and	 10	 trials.	 In	 our	 replication,	 there	were	 always	 exactly	 10	 draws	 for	 this	 training.		
Subjects	were	given	a	Clue	Sheet	with	30	rows.	The	first	10	rows	were	used	for	training,	
and	 then	 their	 clue	 for	 the	 first	market	 period	was	 on	 row	11.	 This	 ensured	 that	 the	
number	 of	 possible	 periods	 on	 their	 Profit	 Sheets	 matched	 the	 number	 of	 remaining	
rows	in	the	Clue	Sheet,	post-training.	
Stage	3.		Subjects	were	given	an	explanation	of	the	market	rules.		Because	we	wanted	to	
use	the	same	sequence	of	state	realizations	as	in	P&S	and	did	not	want	to	deceive	the	
subjects,	 rather	 than	 continuing	 to	 randomly	 draw	 the	 state	 with	 a	 bingo	 cage	 as	 in	
Stage	1,	our	subjects	were	 informed	that	“The	outcomes	were	determined	before	 the	
experiment	began	by	drawing	a	ball	from	a	bingo	cage	in	a	manner	similar	to	what	was	
described	earlier.”		The	subjects	were	not	informed	that	the	draws	occurred	thirty	years	
before	 the	 session.	 We	 also	 went	 through	 an	 example	 sequence	 of	 bids,	 asks,	 and	
acceptances.	 The	 example	 varied	 based	 on	 whether	 one	 or	 multiple	 assets	 were	
available	 for	 trade.	 As	 in	 P&S,	 subjects	 could	 hold	 short	 positions	 during	 trading,	 but	
incurred	a	penalty	equal	to	300	francs	plus	the	highest	transaction	price	in	that	period	
per	unit	short	at	the	end	of	a	trading	period.		This	contrasts	with	Plott	and	Sunder	(1982,	
p.	 696)	 where	 short	 positions	 were	 not	 allowed,	 and	 hence	 this	 necessitated	 a	
modification	to	the	instructions	(see	Appendix	B).			
Stage	 4.	 	 The	market	 was	 conducted	 for	 several	 periods,	 referred	 to	 as	 years	 in	 the	
experiment.	Each	period	lasted	for	7	minutes,	and	all	bids,	asks,	and	contracts	were	left	
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visible	on	the	board	until	 the	period	ended.	We	conducted	the	sessions	 in	rooms	with	
ample	 whiteboard	 space,	 and	 we	 never	 had	 to	 erase	 information	 mid-period.	 The	
Information	 and	 Record	 Sheets	 were	 collected	 at	 the	 end	 of	 each	 period,	 and	 new	
Information	 and	 Record	 Sheets	 were	 handed	 out	 before	 the	 start	 of	 each	 period	 -	
subjects	 kept	 their	Profit	 Sheet	 throughout	 Stage	 4.	 	 In	 our	 replication,	 subjects	were	
allowed	 to	use	basic	 four-function	 calculators	 to	update	 their	 Information	and	Record	
Sheets	 and	Profit	 Sheet.	 Bids,	 asks,	 and	 contracts	 from	 previous	 periods	were	 erased	
before	the	next	period	began.		Subjects	did	not	know	how	many	periods	of	trading	there	
would	be,	as	the	Profit	Sheet	always	listed	20	periods.			
Stage	5.		The	subjects	received	their	payment	in	private	and	were	dismissed	from	the	
experiment.			
In	Market	 4	where	 the	 series	 type	 changes	mid-session,	 the	 subjects	 repeated	 Stage	 3	 after	
period	9.		In	Markets	5	and	8,	which	involve	only	experienced	subjects	and	were	conducted	as	
brand-new	sessions,	we	repeated	all	five	stages.			
Finally,	 to	 guard	 against	 any	 bias	 from	 the	 auctioneer,	 the	 person	 serving	 in	 that	 role	 was	
unaware	of	 the	 rational	 expectations	 price	 in	 every	 case	 and	unfamiliar	with	 the	 specifics	 of	
P&S,	although	that	person	had	experience	conducting	double	auctions	in	a	classroom	setting.	
	
4.	Results	
In	this	section	we	present	our	results	in	a	manner	parallel	to	the	presentation	in	P&S.		We	first	
show	 the	 graphs	 representing	 all	 asset	 prices	 in	 each	 period	 of	 the	 four	 replications	 of	 each	
market.	Horizontal	lines	indicate	the	predictions	of	the	three	competing	models.		The	width	of	
each	figure	 is	standardized	to	facilitate	period-by-period	comparisons	across	markets	because	
despite	 the	 common	 duration	 of	 each	 period,	 the	 number	 of	 periods	 varies	 substantially	 by	
market.7		A	first	visual	inspection,	as	done	in	P&S,	suggests	that	prices	differ	from	the	RE	model	
predictions	 regardless	 of	 the	 series	 and	 the	market.	 In	 Table	 3,	 we	 assess	 these	 differences	
using	the	same	statistical	approach	as	in	P&S.	
Tables	3,	4,	and	5	present	the	same	analyses	for	the	replication	data	that	P&S	present	in	Tables	
III,	IV,	and	V	for	the	original	data	(P&S,	pp.	1105-1107).	They	are	used	to	assess	Conclusions	2,	
3,	and	4	of	P&S	that	RE	will	outperform	both	PI	and	MM	models	in	predicting	prices	(Table	3),	
allocations	 (Table	 4)	 and	 profits	 (Table	 5).	We	did	 not	 replicate	 these	 conclusions,	 as	 the	 RE	
model	 did	 not	 outperform	both	models	 at	 a	 5%	 significance	 level,	 regardless	 of	whether	we	
look	at	prices,	allocations	or	profits.	
																																								 																				
7	The	trades	are	presented	in	sequential	order,	but	timing	within	the	7-minute	trading	period	is	not	reflected.					
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Figure	1a.		Prices	in	Market	4	Sessions	–	Asset	X	
	
Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 Z	 Z	 Z	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Y	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 97	 10	 20	 170	 215	 80	 215	 -	 -	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Rep	 84	 52	 57	 88	 107	 73	 98	 69	 78	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	1b.		Prices	in	Market	4	Sessions	–	Asset	Y	
	
Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 Z	 Z	 Z	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Y	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 58	 57	 -	 2	 -	 154	 1	 158	 -	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Rep	 97	 64	 72	 53	 58	 89	 67	 107	 64	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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Figure	1c.		Prices	in	Market	4	Sessions	–	Asset	Z	
	
Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 Z	 Z	 Z	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Y	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 181	 223	 268	 -	 -	 -	 -	 175	 286	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Rep	 104	 86	 83	 77	 68	 67	 52	 77	 108	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	2a.		Prices	in	Market	5	Sessions	-	Asset	X	
	
Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 X	 Z	 Y	 Y	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 181	 100	 46	 4	 250	 385	 -	 414	 -	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Rep	 175	 83	 86	 79	 210	 252	 98	 229	 35	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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Figure	2b.		Prices	in	Market	5	Sessions	-	Asset	Y	
	
Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 X	 Z	 Y	 Y	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 156	 109	 299	 296	 1	 31	 306	 -	 -	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Rep	 95	 71	 245	 253	 83	 108	 256	 150	 90	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	2c.		Prices	in	Market	5	Sessions	-	Asset	Z	
	
Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 X	 Z	 Y	 Y	 X	 X	 Y	 X	 Z	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 193	 315	 1	 67	 1	 32	 -	 1	 449	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Rep	 70	 255	 130	 104	 100	 95	 87	 81	 362	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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Figure	3.		Prices	in	Market	7	Sessions	
	
Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 14	 	 	 	
State	 Z	 X	 X	 X	 X	 Y	 Y	 X	 Z	 Y	 Z	 Z	 Y	 X	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	
P&S	 291	 222	 197	 228	 170	 235	 241	 148	 256	 246	 348	 449	 240	 84	 	 	 	
Rep	 239	 304	 223	 229	 233	 231	 238	 196	 271	 248	 279	 311	 249	 121	 	 	 	
	
Figure	4.		Prices	in	Market	8	Sessions	
	
Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
State	 Z	 X	 Z	 Y	 Y	 Y	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average	Prices	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
P&S	 512	 140	 517	 376	 366	 369	 126	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Rep	 438	 214	 454	 370	 376	 384	 265	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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	 Figure	5.		Prices	in	M
arket	9	Sessions	
	
Period	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
State	
Y	
X	
Y	
X	
Z	
Y	
Y	
X	
X	
Y	
Z	
Z	
Y	
Y	
X	
Z	
Z	
Average	Prices	
P&
S	
253	
100	
229	
95	
458	
240	
245	
50	
175	
242	
490	
480	
240	
240	
50	
489	
489	
Rep	
278	
237	
235	
189	
247	
271	
244	
201	
218	
251	
267	
273	
248	
254	
175	
250	
245	
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Prices	
Regarding	prices,	we	assess	the	performance	of	the	respective	models	using	the	three	criteria	
proposed	by	P&S:	mean	absolute	price	deviation	(hereafter,	MAD),	log	odds	and	percentage	of	
convergent	price	changes.	Following	P&S,	we	give	information	aggregation	its	“best	chance”	by	
only	considering	the	last	occurrence	of	each	of	the	possible	asset	values	for	each	market	(i.e.,	
periods	7,	8,	and	9	for	Market	4	and	periods	14,	15,	and	17	for	Market	9).	To	assess	the	mean	
absolute	 price	 deviation	 (MAD)	 ,	 we	 calculate	 the	 average	 across	 sessions	 of	 the	 absolute	
difference	 between	 the	 price	 and	 the	 value	 predicted	 by	 each	model	 (PI,	 RE	 and	MM)	 (see	
Appendix	A	or	P&S).		For	each	session,	this	value	is	calculated	as:		!"# ∶=  average!,! !!,! −!!  
where !	represents	a	transaction,	t	denotes	a	period	in	which	a	state	was	realized	for	the	last	
time,	 !!,!	 corresponds	 to	 the	 transaction	 price,	 and	 !!	 is	 the	 predicted	 price	 under	 the	
appropriate	model.	Thus,	the	mean	absolute	price	deviation	is	computed	as	the	average	over	all	
transactions	 in	 the	 last	 occurrence	 of	 each	 state	 of	 nature	 for	 each	 session.	 The	 second	
measure	 used	 in	 P&S	 is	 log	 odds,	 which	 we	 calculated	 by	 regressing,	 for	 each	 model,	 the	
observed	prices	in	given	session	on	the	predicted	price	under	that	model	(using	price	data	from	
the	periods	corresponding	to	the	last	occurrence	of	each	state	of	nature).	We	then	recovered	
the	 log	 likelihood	 value	 under	 the	 normality	 assumption.	 A	 third	 measure	 of	 information	
aggregation	 developed	 in	 P&S	 is	 the	 percentage	 of	 convergent	 price	 changes.	 The	! + 1!"	
transaction	 is	considered	to	be	convergent	 if	 its	price	 is	no	further	from	the	selected	model’s	
prediction	 than	 the	 price	 of	 the	 previous	 transaction,	!.	 That	 is,	 the	! + 1!"	 transaction	 is	
deemed	convergent	if:		 !!!!,! −!! ≤ !!,! −!! 	
where	!!	 is	the	market	price	of	the	!!!	transaction.	For	each	model,	the	ratio	of	convergent	
price	changes	to	the	total	number	of	transactions	over	the	three	periods	in	which	a	state	was	
realized	for	the	last	time	per	session	is	reported	in	Table	3.8		
An	overview	of	Table	3	shows	that	the	RE	model	does	not	outperform	the	other	two	models,	
regardless	of	the	criterion	or	the	series	we	consider.	The	RE	model	actually	underperforms	the	
PI	model	on	the	criterion	of	mean	absolute	price	deviation	(p-value	=	0.048)	when	considering,	
as	 in	 P&S,	 all	 sessions	 from	 Series	 B	 and	 C.	 But,	 the	 RE	 model	 does	 outperform	 PI	 on	 the	
criterion	 of	 percentage	 of	 convergent	 price	 changes	 even	 though	 RE	 does	 not	 significantly	
outperform	MM	for	this	criterion.	No	model	stands	out	with	regard	to	the	criterion	of	log	odds.	
If	 we	 take	 Series	 B	 and	 C	 separately,	 we	 obtain	 a	 similar	 finding;	 RE	 does	 not	 perform	
																																								 																				
8	As	an	initial	transaction	is	required	to	determine	if	the	subsequent	transaction	is	convergent,	we	utilize	the	total	
number	of	transactions	minus	three	(since	we	consider	three	market	periods)	as	the	denominator	in	this	ratio.	
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significantly	better	 than	both	of	 the	other	 two	models	according	 to	any	of	 the	 three	criteria.	
This	contradicts	Conclusion	2	in	P&S	(p.	1104)	according	to	which	“In	markets	with	a	complete	
set	of	state	contingent	securities	(Series	B)	and	in	markets	with	a	single	security	with	uniform	
dividends	(Series	C)	the	RE	model	price	predictions	outperform	both	PI	and	MM.”		
Finding	1:	We	are	unable	to	replicate	the	finding	that	the	RE	model	outperforms	the	PI	and	MM	
models	in	terms	of	predicting	prices	in	the	Series	B	and	C	markets.	
Allocations	
As	in	P&S,	we	proceed	by	assessing	whether	the	allocation	of	shares	at	the	end	of	each	period	
(corresponding	to	the	last	occurrence	of	each	state	of	nature)	is	consistent	with	the	allocation	
predicted	by	each	model	(see	Appendix	A	or	P&S),	and	we	compare	the	fit	across	models.	The	
allocation	statistic	is	determined	via	the	formula:	! = !!,! −!∈!!!∈! !! !!,!(!) − !!!∈!!!∈! !100	
where	!!,! 	represents	the	number	of	shares	of	certificates	c	held	by	investor	!	at	the	end	of	the	
market,	Ic	denotes	the	set	of	traders	predicted	to	hold	the	asset,	C	denotes	the	set	of	certificates	
in	 the	 market,	 !!,!(!)	 corresponds	 to	 the	 number	 of	 shares	 predicted	 to	 be	 held	 by	 investor	 !	
according	to	model	m,	and	!	is	set	to	the	average	number	of	shares	initially	held	by	all	investors	
in	 Ic.	This	ratio	is	then	averaged	over	the	three	periods	in	which	each	state	was	realized	for	the	
last	 time.	 	 The	 values	 for	 each	 replicate	 of	 each	 session	 are	 shown	 in	 Table	 4	 and	 can	 be	
compared	to	Table	IV	in	P&S.	
	
In	line	with	our	previous	findings	on	price	predictions,	the	RE	model	does	not	outperform	either	
PI	 or	MM.	 These	 findings	 contradict	 Conclusion	 3	 in	 P&S	 (p.	 1106)	 according	 to	 which	 “In	 all	
series,	 allocations	 aggregated	 over	 the	 final	 occurrence	 of	 each	 state	 are	 more	 accurately	
predicted	by	the	RE	model	than	either	the	PI	or	MM.”	However,	when	looking	at	Series	B	only	we	
do	find	that	the	RE	model	outperforms	PI	which	is	the	only	alternative	model	for	which	we	have	a	
prediction.		
Finding	2:	We	are	unable	to	replicate	the	 finding	that	RE	outperforms	PI	and	MM	in	predicting	
final	asset	allocations	in	the	Series	B	and	C	markets,	though	RE	outperforms	PI	when	evaluating	
Series	B	markets	separately.	
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Table	3.		Com
parison	of	Actual	Prices	to	Prices	Predicted	by	Three	M
odels	at	the	End	of	Each	M
arket	
M
arket	Experim
ents	
M
AD	
Log	O
dds	U
nder	N
orm
ality	
Percentage	of	Convergent	Price	Changes	
Series	
M
arket	
Replicate	
PI	
RE	
M
M
	
PI	
RE	
M
M
	
PI	
RE	
M
M
	
B	
4	
1	
75.9	
152.88	
90.88	
-216.24	
-225.24	
-239.01	
37.50	
50.00	
66.67	
2	
76.2	
127.00	
58.58	
-183.83	
-184.21	
-212.05	
37.50	
58.33	
62.50	
3	
47.3	
115.00	
89.92	
-197.98	
-210.01	
-232.44	
62.50	
75.00	
62.50	
4	
52.11	
121.00	
93.86	
-224.90	
-250.29	
-265.10	
35.71	
62.50	
85.71	
5	
1	
58.10	
225.00	
215.90	
-686.42	
-677.50	
-781.58	
38.10	
42.86	
33.33	
2	
109.00	
262.00	
252.20	
-731.43	
-686.31	
-814.38	
40.91	
40.91	
31.82	
3	
95.70	
260.00	
281.50	
-726.08	
-691.72	
-840.57	
35.71	
53.57	
35.71	
4	
95.86	
225.00	
257.30	
-629.24	
-612.03	
-698.57	
40.00	
45.00	
20.00	
C	
7	
1	
98.80	
104.05	
54.05	
-188.57	
-262.57	
-250.43	
56.00	
60.00	
44.00	
2	
131.00	
50.60	
31.11	
-206.06	
-196.63	
-186.21	
53.57	
50.00	
46.43	
3	
152.00	
17.00	
39.65	
-402.91	
-332.67	
-372.38	
47.62	
66.67	
33.33	
4	
93.78	
139.00	
156.10	
-272.60	
-338.71	
-318.74	
46.88	
50.00	
53.13	
8	
1	
134.00	
56.20	
31.23	
-150.20	
-154.51	
-142.17	
53.85	
46.15	
69.23	
2	
103.00	
14.10	
55.40	
-182.75	
-156.68	
-170.40	
43.75	
50.00	
56.25	
3	
75.00	
125.00	
157.80	
-183.25	
-211.84	
-209.95	
36.36	
45.45	
36.36	
4	
35.79	
82.20	
71.27	
-158.08	
-200.83	
-194.25	
0.500	
35.00	
40.00	
9	
1	
57.2	
145.00	
61.53	
-244.81	
-306.81	
-294.03	
53.57	
75.00	
60.71	
2	
48.3	
131.00	
53.00	
-154.65	
-215.91	
-201.88	
50.00	
42.86	
57.14	
3	
50.6	
143.00	
72.50	
-193.37	
-241.66	
-229.72	
54.55	
59.09	
59.09	
4	
98.11	
102.00	
15.96	
-249.64	
-268.37	
-226.30	
56.00	
68.00	
60.00	
W
ilcoxon	Signed	Ranked	Sum
	Tests	
	
			↑______↑	
			↓	
↑______↑	
								↓	
↑________↑	
↓	
↑________↑	
↓	
								↑__________↑	
									↓	
↑__________↑	
													↓	
B-series	Sessions	
0	
0.012(PI)	
9	
0.208(M
M
)	
	
22	
0.575(RE)	
36	
0.012(RE)	
0	
0.014(RE)	
13	
0.484(RE)	
C-series	Sessions	
35	
0.754(PI)	
19	
0.117(M
M
)	
61	
0.084(PI)	
59	
0.117(M
M
)	
15	
0.060(RE)	
25	
0.505(RE)	
All	Sessions	
52	
0.048(PI)	
53	
0.052(M
M
)	
140	
0.191(PI)	
144	
0.145(RE)	
19	
0.002(RE)	
71	
0.341(RE)	
Reported	m
etrics	for	each	session	are	based	on	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	X,	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Y,	and	the	last	period	in	w
hich	
the	state	w
as	Z.		Each	statistical	test	com
pares	RE	to	an	alternative	m
odel.		Each	cell	in	the	low
er	portion	of	the	table	contains	the	associated	test	statistic	
and	level	of	significance	as	w
ell.		The	m
odel	in	parentheses	is	the	one	favored	by	the	data.		This	table	is	com
parable	to	Table	III	in	Plott	and	Sunder	(1988).			
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Table	4.		Comparison	of	Actual	Allocations	with	the	Allocations	Predicted	by	Three	Models	
Criterion:	Percent	of	Predicted	Flow	of	Securities	that	Actually	Occurred	at	the	End	of	Each	Market	
Market	Experiments	 Models	
Series	 Market	 Replicate	 PI	 RE	 MM	
B	
4	
1	 4.44	 12.5	 No	Prediction	
2	 3.89	 12.5	 No	Prediction	
3	 3.89	 22.92	 No	Prediction	
4	 9.45	 12.50	 No	Prediction	
5	
1	 14.88	 45.83	 No	Prediction	
2	 16.67	 50.00	 No	Prediction	
3	 20.83	 70.83	 No	Prediction	
4	 14.83	 52.08	 No	Prediction	
C	
7	
1	 31.94	 No	Prediction	 41.67	
2	 27.78	 No	Prediction	 25.00	
3	 9.21	 No	Prediction	 27.08	
4	 38.89	 No	Prediction	 47.92	
8	
1	 5.56	 No	Prediction	 45.84	
2	 38.89	 No	Prediction	 37.50	
3	 52.78	 No	Prediction	 29.17	
4	 30.56	 No	Prediction	 49.99	
9	
1	 40.28	 No	Prediction	 52.09	
2	 26.39	 No	Prediction	 27.09	
3	 23.61	 No	Prediction	 25.00	
4	 43.06	 No	Prediction	 60.42	
Wilcoxon	Rank	Sum	Tests	
	
													↑____________↑	
																						↓	
↑____________↑	
																					↓	
B-series	Sessions	 88	
0.035(RE)	 Undefined	
C-series	Sessions	 Undefined	 Undefined	
All	Sessions	 265	
0.203(RE)	
135	
0.487(MM)	
Reported	metrics	 for	 each	 session	 are	 based	 on	 the	 last	 period	 in	 which	 the	 state	 was	 X,	 the	 last	
period	 in	which	 the	 state	was	 Y,	 and	 the	 last	 period	 in	which	 the	 state	was	 Z,	 as	 applicable.	 	 Each	
statistical	 test	 compares	 RE	 to	 an	 alternative	 model.	 	 Each	 cell	 in	 the	 lower	 portion	 of	 the	 table	
contains	the	associated	test	statistic	and	level	of	significance	as	well.		The	model	in	parentheses	is	the	
one	favored	by	the	data	based	on	the	median.		This	table	is	comparable	to	Table	IV	in	Plott	and	Sunder	
(1988).	 	 However,	 P&S	 report	 that	 a	Wilcoxon	 Signed	 Rank	 Sum	 Test	 is	 used,	 but	 that	 test	 is	 not	
defined	 for	any	comparison	between	RE	and	another	model	except	 for	a	 test	between	PI	and	RE	 in	
Series-B	Markets.	 	The	 test	 statistic	 for	 such	a	 test	would	be	0	based	on	our	data	with	a	p-value	of	
0.012	with	the	data	favoring	RE.							
	
Profits	
	
Finally,	 we	 compare	 the	 models’	 predictions	 on	 the	 distribution	 of	 profits.	 In	 Table	 5	
(comparable	to	Table	V	in	P&S),	we	display	the	weighted	sum	of	the	squared	deviation	between	
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the	 average	 earnings	 of	 a	 trader	 of	 a	 given	 type	 and	 information	 and	 the	 average	 predicted	
earnings,	 given	 the	 trader’s	 type	 and	 information,	 averaged	 over	 the	 three	 periods	
corresponding	to	the	last	occurrence	of	each	state	of	nature.9	In	line	with	our	previous	findings	
on	 price	 and	 allocation	 predictions,	 we	 do	 not	 find	 that	 the	 RE	 model	 outperforms	 both	
alternatives;	 although,	 it	 significantly	 outperforms	 PI.	 These	 findings	 lead	 us	 to	 reject	
Conclusion	4	 in	P&S	 (p.	1108)	according	 to	which	“In	all	 series	 the	RE	model	 is	a	 significantly	
better	predictor	of	the	distribution	of	profits	than	either	the	PI	model	or	the	MM	model.”	On	a	
positive	 note,	 when	 studied	 separately	 RE	 is	 shown	 to	 outperform	 the	 other	 two	models	 in	
Series	C	markets.	 	However,	 the	profit	prediction	of	 the	RE	model	 for	Series	C	markets	 is	 for	
every	trader	in	the	market	to	receive	the	same	profit.		Hence	the	RE	model	predicts	that	each	
person	receives	 the	average	profit,	which	may	drive	some	of	 the	apparent	success.	 	A	model	
that	predicted	no	one	ever	placed	a	bid	or	ask	in	the	market	would	have	done	equally	well	on	
this	criterion	for	Series	C.	
Finding	3:	We	are	unable	to	replicate	the	 finding	that	RE	outperforms	PI	and	MM	in	predicting	
traders’	profits	in	the	Series	B	and	C	markets,	though	RE	outperforms	PI	and	MM	when	evaluating	
Series	C	markets	separately.	
As	a	final	note,	experience	does	not	seem	to	encourage	information	aggregation	in	our	sample,	
as	 evidence	 for	 information	 aggregation	was	 not	 found	 despite	 using	 for	 each	 session,	 as	 in	
P&S,	only	the	data	for	the	last	occurrence	of	each	possible	state	of	nature.10	Moreover,	we	do	
not	find	support	for	the	RE	model	prediction	when	restricting	our	analysis	to	the	8	sessions	in	
which	 the	market	was	 populated	 by	 experienced	 traders	 (see	Appendix	 C	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	
Markets	5	and	8	combined).	
5.	Discussion	
Whether	markets	 are	 able	 to	 aggregate	 dispersed	 information	 is	 a	 fundamental	 question	 in	
Economics	(Hayek,	1945).	Because	testing	the	strong-form	efficiency	of	markets	is	not	possible	
using	 archival	 data	 (Fama,	 1991),	 experimental	 markets	 were	 critical	 to	 test	 whether	 such	
efficiency	was	achievable.	The	breakthrough	design	proposed	by	P&S	 thus	made	 the	efficient	
markets	hypothesis	falsifiable.	Although	the	original	findings	in	P&S	show	that	it	is	possible	for	
markets	 to	 achieve	 strong-form	 efficiency,	 our	 data	 show	 these	 findings	 are	 indeed	 fragile.	
Moreover,	neither	the	existence	of	contingent	claims	nor	common	dividend	values	seem	to	be	
																																								 																				
9	 Each	model	 is	 silent	with	 regards	 to	which	 specific	 traders	 of	 a	 given	 type	with	 a	 given	 piece	 of	 information	
should	hold	 the	assets.	That	 is,	 if	 two	 traders	are	of	 the	 type	and	 information	predicted	 to	purchase	 two	assets	
being	offered	 for	 sale,	 the	models	 are	 silent	 as	 to	whether	one	 trader	will	 buy	both	or	 each	will	 buy	one.	 	Our	
approach	thus	removes	profit	deviations	that	are	due	to	the	allocation	of	assets	within	a	given	class	of	trader.					
10	The	general	conclusions	do	not	differ	if	data	from	every	trading	period	is	used.				
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sufficient	 to	 facilitate	 information	 aggregation.	 Our	 results	 thus	 call	 for	 a	 revival	 of	 research	
examining	the	institutional	and	behavioral	factors	that	can	give	rise	to	efficient	markets.	
	
	
Table	5.		Comparison	of	Actual	Distribution	of	Profits	to	Distribution	Predicted	by	Three	Models	
Criterion:	Squared	Sum	of	Deviations	from	the	Mean	Across	Investors	at	the	End	of	Each	Market	
Market	Experiments	 Models	
Series	 Market	 Replicate	 PI	 RE	 MM	
B	
4	
1	 8644.73	 638.31	 245.51	
2	 8782.26	 684.59	 262.73	
3	 8932.91	 686.13	 283.23	
4	 8302.06	 604.81	 245.21	
5	
1	 24266.25	 2721.85	 1949.32	
2	 25360.95	 2474.61	 2182.88	
3	 24838.72	 1912.72	 1989.12	
4	 25273.38	 2858.71	 2068.18	
C	
7	
1	 4281.22	 49.62	 3422.95	
2	 4752.76	 7.30	 3787.30	
3	 5473.51	 36.55	 4783.22	
4	 3408.69	 201.63	 2894.96	
8	
1	 819.42	 51.95	 145.95	
2	 729.95	 3.95	 42.61	
3	 272.03	 1220.29	 1578.69	
4	 952.74	 13.57	 401.57	
9	
1	 1489.34	 1197.76	 951.10	
2	 2969.62	 95.46	 3762.12	
3	 2224.53	 256.19	 2989.52	
4	 2133.63	 361.39	 1971.72	
Wilcoxon	Signed	Ranked	Sum	Tests	
	
								↑_________↑	
																↓	
↑_________↑	
																↓	
B-series	Sessions	 36	
0.012(RE)	
35	
0.017(MM)	
C-series	Sessions	 73	
0.008(RE)	
75	
0.005(RE)	
All	Sessions	 205	
<0.001(RE)	
139	
0.204(RE)	
Reported	metrics	for	each	session	are	based	on	the	last	period	in	which	the	state	was	X,	
the	last	period	in	which	the	state	was	Y,	and	the	last	period	in	which	the	state	was	Z,	as	
applicable.	 	Each	statistical	test	compares	RE	to	an	alternative	model.	 	Each	cell	 in	the	
lower	portion	of	the	table	contains	the	associated	test	statistic	and	level	of	significance	
as	 well.	 	 The	 model	 in	 parentheses	 is	 the	 one	 favored	 by	 the	 data.	 	 This	 table	 is	
comparable	to	Table	V	in	Plott	and	Sunder	(1988).			
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7.	Appendices	
Appendix	A.	Prediction	tables	(P&S)	
Price	predictions	
Table	A.1.	Price	predictions	for	each	model.	
Market	 Model	 True	State	X	 Y	 Z	
4X	
RE	 230	 0	 0	
PI	 146	 146	 101	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
4Y	
RE	 0	 160	 0	
PI	 58	 58	 49	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
4Z	
RE	 0	 0	 300	
PI	 169	 208	 208	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
5X	
RE	 460	 0	 0	
PI	 230	 230	 230	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
5Y	
RE	 0	 320	 0	
PI	 160	 160	 160	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
5Z	
RE	 0	 0	 600	
PI	 300	 300	 300	
MM	 0	 0	 0	
7	
RE	 50	 240	 590	
PI	 270	 365	 365	
MM	 50	 240	 240	
8	
RE	 125	 375	 450	
PI	 325	 450	 450	
MM	 125	 375	 375	
9	
RE	 50	 240	 490	
PI	 210	 317	 317	
MM	 50	 240	 240	
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Allocation	predictions	
Table	A.2.	Allocation	predictions	for	each	model.	
Type	(I,	II	and	III)	and	clue	of	traders	who	should	hold	the	certificates	according	to	a	given	model.	
Market	 Model	 True	State	X	 Y	 Z	
4X	
RE	 II	 ̶	 ̶	
PI	 II	(Not	Z)	 II	(Not	Z)	 II	(Not	Y)	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
4Y	
RE	 ̶	 III	 ̶	
PI	 III	(Not	Z)	 III	(Not	Z)	 III	(Not	X)	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
4Z	
RE	 ̶	 ̶	 I	
PI	 I	(Not	Y)	 I	(Not	X)	 I	(Not	X)	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
5X	
RE	 II	 ̶	 ̶	
PI	 II	 II	(Not	Z)	 II	(Not	Y)	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
5Y	
RE	 ̶	 III	 ̶	
PI	 III	(Not	Z)	 III	 III	(Not	X)	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
5Z	
RE	 ̶	 ̶	 I	
PI	 I	(Not	Y)	 I	(Not	X)	 I	
MM	 ---------------------No	predictions---------------------------	
7	
RE	 All	(no	trade)	
PI	 Not	Y	 Not	Y	 Not	Y	
MM	 All	(no	trade)	 Not	X	 Not	X	
8	
RE	 All	(no	trade)	
PI	 Not	Y	 Not	X	 Not	X	
MM	 All	(no	trade)	 Not	X	 Not	X	
9	
RE	 All	(no	trade)	
PI	 Not	Y	 Not	Y	 Not	Y	
MM	 All	(no	trade)	 Not	X	 Not	X	
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Appendix	B.	Complete	Set	of	Instructions	
Steps	to	Run	Hand	Run	Information	Aggregation	Markets	
Prior	to	Experiment		
1. Set	up	Bingo	cage	with	correct	number	of	balls	and	have	a	coin	available.	
2. Have	market	program	set	up	on	podium	computer	(not	projected).		Have	document	camera	for	
Market	Operation	Example.	
3. Place	a	numbered	(1	through	12)	notecard	at	each	position	asking	for	subject	name	and	student	id.	
4. Place	a)	calculator,	b)	pen,	c)	Trader	Sign,	and	d)	Subject	Name	and	ID	Card	at	each	position.	
5. Place	a)	Instruction	Set	1,	b)	Response	Form	for	random	draw	training,	and	c)	Clue	Sheets.			
Note:	a)	and	c)	are	market	specific.	
Subject	Sign	in		
6. Subjects	consent	
7. Subjects	fill	out	Subject	Name	and	ID	card	and	RA	signs	them	into	the	market	program	
Experiment	
8. Auctioneer	reads	Script	0	
9. Auctioneer	reads	Script	1			
10. Conduct	10	Drawings	with	replacement	
11. Collect	Response	Forms		
12. Auctioneer	reads	Script	2			
13. Auctioneer	conducts	10	practice	rounds	with	clues.			
a)	draw	a	ball		
b)	flip	coin	
c)	call	out	row	(=practice	number)	and	column	(based	on	draw	and	flip)	
d)	put	ball	back	in	bingo	cage	
14. Handout	a)	Instruction	Set	3,	b)	Profit	Sheet,	and	c)	Year	1	Information	and	Record	Sheet.		Note:	b)	is	
market	specific	while	a)	and	c)	are	market	and	trader	specific.	
15. Auctioneer	reads	Instruction	Set	3.		“___”	is	read	as	blank	because	this	is	private	information	for	
each	trader.					
16. Auctioneer	goes	through	the	Market	Operation	Example.			
Order	of	call	should	be	Trader	#,	Action,	(Market),	Price.				(Market)	is	only	for	contingent	claims.	
17. Conduct	Market	Year		
a)	Handout	Year	Y	record	and	Information	Sheet	(already	done	for	Year	1).		Note:	This	is	market	and	
trader	specific		
b)	Announce	Clue	row	and	column.		Row	is	10+year.		Column	indicated	by	“pickme.”	
c)	Start	7	minute	market	year.		
d)	Repeat	a-c	until	last	Year	completed.		Number	of	Years	differs	by	Market.			For	Market	4,	return	to	
Step	14	after	Year	9.	
18. Collect	all	papers.		Calculate	total	payments	=	Trading	Profit	+	Prediction	Payment	from	12	+	Show	up	
Payment.	
19. Pay	and	dismiss	subjects.				
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Set	0	Script	
This	 is	 an	 experiment	 in	 the	 economics	 of	 market	 decision	 making.	 Various	 research	
foundations	have	provided	funds	for	this	research.	The	instructions	are	simple,	and	if	you	follow	
them	 carefully	 and	 make	 good	 decisions,	 you	 might	 earn	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 money	
which	will	be	paid	to	you	in	cash.	In	this	experiment	we	are	going	to	simulate	a	market	in	which	
you	will	buy	and	sell	certificates	in	a	sequence	of	market	years.		
This	experiment	has	four	steps:	
(1) training	with	the	mechanism	used	to	draw	states	of	nature,		
	
(2) training	with	the	mechanism	used	to	provide	clues	about	the	state	of	nature,		
	
(3) explanation	of	procedures	and	rules	of	the	market,		
	
(4) conduct	of	markets	for	several	years.	
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Set	1	Script	
Instruction	Set	1		[Market	4]	
Each	 year	we	 draw	 a	 ball	 from	 a	 bingo	 cage	 containing	 twenty	 balls	 numbered	 one	 through	
twenty.	If	the	ball	drawn	is	numbered	one	through	seven,	outcome	of	the	draw	is	called	x;	if	a	
ball	numbered	eight	through	eleven	is	drawn,	the	outcome	is	called	y;	if	a	ball	numbered	twelve	
through	twenty	is	drawn,	the	outcome	is	called	z.		
You	 have	 to	 predict	 the	 outcome	 of	 each	 draw	 before	 it	 is	 announced.	 If	 your	 prediction	 is	
correct,	 you	win	 $0.50;	 if	wrong,	 you	 lose	 $0.20.	 Before	 the	 first	 draw	 is	made,	 record	 your	
prediction	by	circling	either	x	or	y	or	 z	 in	 the	 first	 row	of	 the	enclosed	sheet.	After	you	have	
encircled	 one	 letter,	 the	 outcome	will	 be	 announced	 and	 you	 should	 record	 the	 announced	
outcome	in	the	blank	space	on	the	same	row	of	the	table.	If	your	prediction	is	correct,	circle	the	
amount	shown	in	the	Win	column,	otherwise	circle	the	amount	shown	in	the	Lose	column.		
Once	 you	 have	 recorded	 your	 prediction	 you	 must	 not	 make	 a	 change;	 any	 erasure	 will	
invalidate	 your	prediction.	At	 the	end,	 add	up	 your	 total	winnings	 and	 losses	 and	 record	 the	
difference	(net	winnings	or	losses)	at	the	bottom	right	corner	of	the	sheet.	
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States	of	Nature	Training	Sheet	
Subject No. _______ 
Number 
Circle One 
Decision 
Outcome 
x or y or z 
Win 
($) 
Lose 
($) 
1 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
2 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
3 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
4 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
5 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
6 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
7 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
8 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
9 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
10 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
 
       Total winnings      _________        
       Total losses      _________ 
           Net winnings/losses _________ 
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Instruction	Set	1		[Market	9]	
Each	 year	we	 draw	 a	 ball	 from	 a	 bingo	 cage	 containing	 twenty	 balls	 numbered	 one	 through	
twenty.	If	the	ball	drawn	is	numbered	one	through	seven,	outcome	of	the	draw	is	called	x;	if	a	
ball	 numbered	 	 eight	 through	 sixteen	 is	 drawn,	 the	 outcome	 is	 called	 y;	 if	 a	 ball	 numbered	
seventeen	through	twenty	is	drawn,	the	outcome	is	called	z.		
You	 have	 to	 predict	 the	 outcome	 of	 each	 draw	 before	 it	 is	 announced.	 If	 your	 prediction	 is	
correct,	 you	win	 $0.50;	 if	wrong,	 you	 lose	 $0.20.	 Before	 the	 first	 draw	 is	made,	 record	 your	
prediction	by	circling	either	x	or	y	or	 z	 in	 the	 first	 row	of	 the	enclosed	sheet.	After	you	have	
encircled	 one	 letter,	 the	 outcome	will	 be	 announced	 and	 you	 should	 record	 the	 announced	
outcome	in	the	blank	space	on	the	same	row	of	the	table.	If	your	prediction	is	correct,	circle	the	
amount	shown	in	the	Win	column,	otherwise	circle	the	amount	shown	in	the	Lose	column.		
Once	 you	 have	 recorded	 your	 prediction	 you	 must	 not	 make	 a	 change;	 any	 erasure	 will	
invalidate	 your	prediction.	At	 the	end,	 add	up	 your	 total	winnings	 and	 losses	 and	 record	 the	
difference	(net	winnings	or	losses)	at	the	bottom	right	corner	of	the	sheet.	
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Instruction	Set	1		[Markets	5,	7	&	8]	
Each	 year	 we	 draw	 a	 ball	 from	 a	 bingo	 cage	 containing	 thirty	 balls	 numbered	 one	 through	
thirty.	If	the	ball	drawn	is	numbered	one	through	ten,	outcome	of	the	draw	is	called	x;	if	a	ball	
numbered	eleven	through	twenty	is	drawn,	the	outcome	is	called	y;	if	a	ball	numbered	twenty-
one	through	thirty	is	drawn,	the	outcome	is	called	z.		
You	 have	 to	 predict	 the	 outcome	 of	 each	 draw	 before	 it	 is	 announced.	 If	 your	 prediction	 is	
correct,	 you	win	 $0.50;	 if	wrong,	 you	 lose	 $0.20.	 Before	 the	 first	 draw	 is	made,	 record	 your	
prediction	by	circling	either	x	or	y	or	 z	 in	 the	 first	 row	of	 the	enclosed	sheet.	After	you	have	
encircled	 one	 letter,	 the	 outcome	will	 be	 announced	 and	 you	 should	 record	 the	 announced	
outcome	in	the	blank	space	on	the	same	row	of	the	table.	If	your	prediction	is	correct,	circle	the	
amount	shown	in	the	Win	column,	otherwise	circle	the	amount	shown	in	the	Lose	column.		
Once	 you	 have	 recorded	 your	 prediction	 you	 must	 not	 make	 a	 change;	 any	 erasure	 will	
invalidate	 your	prediction.	At	 the	end,	 add	up	 your	 total	winnings	 and	 losses	 and	 record	 the	
difference	(net	winnings	or	losses)	at	the	bottom	right	corner	of	the	sheet. 
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Set	2	Script	
You	have	each	received	a	clue	sheet.		Do	not	reveal	this	sheet	to	anyone.			
You	will	use	 this	 clue	sheet	 to	 receive	a	clue	about	what	 the	outcome	 is	 in	a	particular	year.		
Therefore,	we	will	now	go	through	some	examples	of	how	to	use	the	clue	sheet.	
Each	year	the	experimenter	will	draw	a	bingo	ball	from	the	cage	to	determine	if	the	outcome	is	
x	or	y	or	z.	 	The	experimenter	will	then	call	out	a	row	and	column.	 	You	will	use	this	row	and	
column	 to	 determine	 your	 clue.	 	 The	other	 investors	will	 use	 their	 own	 sheets	 to	 determine	
their	clues.		
If	the	outcome	is	x	then	there	are	two	possible	clues:		not	y	and	not	z	
If	the	outcome	is	y	then	there	are	two	possible	clues:		not	x	and	not	z	
If	the	outcome	is	z	then	there	are	two	possible	clues:		not	x	and	not	y	
	
Everyone’s	sheet	is	different.	 	Which	of	the	two	possible	clues	that	you	receive	is	determined	
randomly.		The	clues	that	other	investors	receive	are	also	determined	randomly.		But	the	clues	
are	distributed	 in	such	a	way	that	exactly	half	of	all	 investors	receive	one	of	the	two	possible	
clues	and	the	other	half	receive	the	other	possible	clue.				
We	will	now	practice	with	the	clue	sheet.	
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Clue	Sheet	[Each	clue	sheet	was	trader	and	Market	Specific]	
	 	
Clue	Sheet	 Trader	#:	 ________	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Columns	
		 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	
1	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	
2	 not	z	 not	x	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	
3	 not	x	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	
4	 not	z	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	x	
5	 not	z	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	
6	 not	x	 not	x	 not	y	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	
7	 not	x	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	
8	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	
9	 not	y	 not	z	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	
10	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	
11	 not	x	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	y	
12	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	
13	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	
14	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	
15	 not	x	 not	y	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	
16	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	
17	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	
18	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	
19	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	 not	x	
20	 not	y	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	 not	x	
21	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	
22	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	
23	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	y	 not	z	
24	 not	x	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	
25	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	
26	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	y	 not	x	
27	 not	x	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	y	 not	z	
28	 not	y	 not	x	 not	x	 not	z	 not	z	 not	y	
29	 not	x	 not	y	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	 not	y	
30	 not	y	 not	y	 not	x	 not	z	 not	z	 not	x	
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Set	3	Script	
Instructions	Set	3		Script		[Single	Asset]	
General.	−	This	is	an	experiment	in	the	economics	of	market	decision	making.	Various	research	
foundations	have	provided	funds	for	this	research.	The	instructions	are	simple,	and	if	you	follow	
them	 carefully	 and	 make	 good	 decisions,	 you	 might	 earn	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 money	
which	will	be	paid	to	you	in	cash.		
In	this	experiment	we	are	going	to	simulate	a	market	in	which	you	will	buy	and	sell	certificates	
in	 a	 sequence	 of	 market	 years.	 Attached	 to	 the	 instructions	 you	 will	 find	 a	 sheet,	 labeled	
information	 and	 record	 sheet,	which	 helps	 determine	 the	 value	 to	 you	 of	 any	 decisions	 you	
might	 make.	 You	 are	 not	 to	 reveal	 this	 information	 to	 anyone.	 It	 is	 your	 own	 private	
information.		
The	type	of	currency	used	in	this	market	is	francs.	All	trading	and	earnings	will	be	in	terms	of	
francs.	Each	franc	is	worth	____	to	you.	Do	not	reveal	this	number	to	anyone.	At	the	end	of	the	
experiment	your	francs	will	be	converted	to	dollars	at	this	rate,	and	you	will	be	paid	in	dollars.	
Notice	that	the	more	francs	you	earn	the	more	dollars	you	earn.		
	
Specific	Instructions		
Your	profits	come	from	two	sources-from	collecting	certificate	earnings	on	all	certificates	you	
hold	at	the	end	of	the	year	and	from	buying	and	selling	certificates.	During	each	market	year	
you	are	free	to	purchase	or	sell	as	many	certificates	as	you	wish,	provided	you	follow	the	rules	
below.	For	each	certificate	you	hold	at	the	end	of	the	year	you	will	be	given	one	of	the	three	
numbers	of	 francs	 listed	on	row	19	of	your	 information	and	record	sheet.	Note	that	earnings	
may	 be	 different	 for	 different	 investors.	 The	method	 by	which	 one	 of	 the	 three	 numbers	 is	
selected	 each	 year	 is	 explained	 later	 in	 these	 instructions.	 Compute	 your	 total	 certificate	
earnings	 for	a	period	by	multiplying	the	earnings	per	certificate	by	the	number	of	certificates	
held.	 That	 is,	 (number	 of	 certificates	 held)	 x	 (earnings	 per	 certificate)	 =	 total	 certificate	
earnings.	Suppose,	for	example,	that	you	hold	five	certificates	at	the	end	of	year	1.	 If	for	that	
period	your	earnings	are	_____	francs	per	certificate	(i.e.,	the	number	selected	from	row	19	is	
____)	 then	 your	 total	 certificate	 earnings	 in	 the	 year	would	 be	 5	 x	 ____	 =	 ____	 francs.	 This	
number	should	be	recorded	on	row	19	at	the	end	of	the	year.		
Sales	 from	 your	 certificate	 holdings	 increase	 your	 francs	 on	 hand	 by	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 sale	
price.	 Similarly,	 purchases	 reduce	 your	 francs	 on	hand	by	 the	 amount	of	 the	purchase	price.	
Thus	you	can	gain	or	lose	money	on	the	purchase	and	resale	of	certificates.	At	the	end	of	each	
year	 all	 your	 holdings	 are	 automatically	 sold	 to	 the	 experimenter	 at	 a	 price	 of	 0.	 At	 the	
beginning	of	each	year	you	are	provided	with	an	initial	holding	of	certificates.	This	is	recorded	
on	row	0	of	the	year's	information	and	record	sheet.	You	may	sell	these	if	you	wish	or	you	may	
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hold	them.	If	you	hold	a	certificate,	then	you	receive	"earnings	per	certificate"	at	the	end	of	the	
year.		
	In	addition,	at	the	beginning	of	each	year	you	are	provided	with	an	initial	amount	of	francs	on	
hand.	This	is	also	recorded	on	row	0	of	each	year's	information	and	record	sheet.	You	may	keep	
this	if	you	wish	or	you	may	use	it	to	purchase	certificates.		
Thus	at	the	beginning	of	each	year	you	are	endowed	with	holdings	of	certificates	and	francs	on	
hand.	You	are	free	to	buy	and	sell	certificates	as	you	wish	according	to	the	rules	below.	Your	
francs	on	hand	at	the	end	of	a	year	are	determined	by	your	 initial	amount	of	francs	on	hand,	
earnings	on	certificate	holdings	at	the	end	of	the	year,	and	by	gains	and	losses	from	purchases	
and	sales	of	certificates.	All	 francs	on	hand	at	the	end	of	a	year	 in	excess	of	_____	francs	are	
yours	to	keep.	These	are	your	profits	for	the	year.	
	
Information	about	Dividends		
Whether	 the	dividend	 you	 receive	 from	 the	 certificates	 you	hold	 is	 the	x-dividend	 shown	on	
row	19	or	 the	y-dividend	on	 row	19	or	 the	z-dividend	on	 row	19	depends	on	 the	draw	of	an	
outcome	from	a	bingo	cage.		If	the	outcome	is	x	the	dividend	is	the	x-dividend.	If	the	outcome	is	
y	 the	 dividend	 is	 the	 y-dividend.	 	 If	 the	 outcome	 is	 z	 the	 dividend	 is	 the	 z-dividend.	 	 The	
outcomes	were	determined	before	the	experiment	began	by	drawing	a	ball	from	a	bingo	cage	
in	a	manner	similar	to	what	was	described	earlier.			
As	a	reminder,	each	year	there	is	a	_35_%	chance	that	the	outcome	is	x;	a	_45_%	chance	that	
the	outcome	is	y;	and	a	_20_%	chance	that	the	outcome	is	z.				
At	the	beginning	of	each	year,	before	trading	starts,	each	investor	will	receive	a	clue	using	the	
clue	sheets	you	have	already	received.			
	
Trading	and	Recording	Rules		
(1) All	 transactions	are	for	one	certificate	at	a	time.	After	each	of	your	sales	or	purchases	
you	must	record	the	TRANSACTION	PRICE	in	the	appropriate	column	depending	on	the	
nature	of	 the	transaction.	The	first	 transaction	 is	 recorded	on	row	(1),	and	succeeding	
transactions	are	recorded	on	subsequent	rows.	
(2) After	each	transaction	you	must	calculate	and	record	your	new	holdings	of	certificates	
and	 your	 new	 francs	 on	 hand.	 Your	 holdings	 of	 certificates	may	 go	 below	 zero.	 Your	
francs	on	hand	may	never	go	below	zero.		
(3) At	the	end	of	the	year	record	your	total	certificate	earnings	in	the	last	column	of	row	19.	
If	you	have	negative	certificate	holdings,	you	receive	no	dividends,	and	you	must	pay	a	
penalty	 of	 300	 francs	 plus	 the	 highest	 transaction	 price	 during	 the	 period,	 for	 each	
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certificate	 you	 are	 short.	 Compute	 your	 end	 of	 period	 totals	 on	 row	 20	 by	 listing	
certificate	holdings	and	adding	total	certificate	earnings	to	your	francs	on	hand.	
(4) At	the	end	of	the	year,	subtract	from	your	francs	on	hand	the	amount	listed	in	row	21	
and	 enter	 this	 new	 amount	 on	 row	 22.	 This	 is	 your	 profit	 for	 the	market	 year	 and	 is	
yours	to	keep.	At	the	end	of	each	market	year,	record	this	number	on	your	profit	sheet.	
(5) At	the	end	of	the	experiment	add	up	your	total	profit	on	your	profit	sheet	and	enter	this	
sum	on	row	22	of	your	profit	sheet.	To	convert	this	number	into	dollars,	multiply	by	the	
number	on	 row	23	and	 record	 the	product	on	 row	24.	The	experimenter	will	pay	you	
this	amount	of	money.	
	
Market	organization.	−	The	market	for	these	certificates	is	organized	as	follows.	The	market	will	
be	 conducted	 in	 a	 series	 of	 years.	 Each	 period	 lasts	 for	 seven	 minutes.	 Anyone	 wishing	 to	
purchase	 a	 certificate	 is	 free	 to	 raise	 his	 or	 her	 hand	 and	 make	 a	 verbal	 bid	 to	 buy	 one	
certificate	at	a	specified	price,	and	anyone	with	certificates	to	sell	is	free	to	accept	or	not	accept	
the	bid.	Likewise,	anyone	wishing	to	sell	a	certificate	is	free	to	raise	his	or	her	hand	and	make	a	
verbal	offer	 to	 sell	one	 certificate	at	 a	 specified	price.	 If	 a	bid	or	offer	 is	 accepted,	 a	binding	
contract	 has	 been	 closed	 for	 a	 single	 certificate,	 and	 the	 contracting	 parties	 will	 record	 the	
transaction	 on	 their	 information	 and	 record	 sheets.	 Any	 ties	 in	 bids	 or	 acceptance	 will	 be	
resolved	by	random	choice.	Except	for	the	bids	and	their	acceptance,	you	are	not	to	speak	to	
any	other	subject.	There	are	likely	to	be	many	bids	that	are	not	accepted,	but	you	are	free	to	
keep	trying.	You	are	free	to	make	as	much	profit	as	you	can.	
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Instructions	Set	3		Script		[Contingent	Claims]	
General.	−	This	is	an	experiment	in	the	economics	of	market	decision	making.	Various	research	
foundations	have	provided	funds	for	this	research.	The	instructions	are	simple,	and	if	you	follow	
them	 carefully	 and	 make	 good	 decisions,	 you	 might	 earn	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 money	
which	will	be	paid	to	you	in	cash.		
In	this	experiment	we	are	going	to	simulate	a	market	in	which	you	will	buy	and	sell	certificates	
in	 a	 sequence	 of	 market	 years.	 Attached	 to	 the	 instructions	 you	 will	 find	 a	 sheet,	 labeled	
information	 and	 record	 sheet,	which	 helps	 determine	 the	 value	 to	 you	 of	 any	 decisions	 you	
might	 make.	 You	 are	 not	 to	 reveal	 this	 information	 to	 anyone.	 It	 is	 your	 own	 private	
information.		
The	type	of	currency	used	in	this	market	is	francs.	All	trading	and	earnings	will	be	in	terms	of	
francs.	Each	franc	is	worth	____	to	you.	Do	not	reveal	this	number	to	anyone.	At	the	end	of	the	
experiment	your	francs	will	be	converted	to	dollars	at	this	rate,	and	you	will	be	paid	in	dollars.	
Notice	that	the	more	francs	you	earn	the	more	dollars	you	earn.		
	
Specific	Instructions		
Your	profits	come	from	two	sources-from	collecting	certificate	earnings	on	all	certificates	you	
hold	at	the	end	of	the	year	and	from	buying	and	selling	certificates.	During	each	market	year	
you	are	free	to	purchase	or	sell	as	many	certificates	as	you	wish,	provided	you	follow	the	rules	
below.	 There	 are	 three	 types	 of	 certificate:	 x-certificate,	 y-certificate,	 and	 z-certificate.	 	 For	
each	certificate	of	a	given	type	that	you	hold	at	the	end	of	the	year	you	will	be	given	either	the	
number	of	francs	listed	on	row	19	of	your	information	and	record	sheet	for	that	certificate	type	
or	0.	Note	that	earnings	may	be	different	for	different	investors.	The	method	by	which	one	of	
the	 two	 numbers	 for	 each	 certificate	 type	 is	 selected	 each	 year	 is	 explained	 later	 in	 these	
instructions.	 Compute	 your	 total	 certificate	 earnings	 for	 a	 period	by	multiplying	 the	earnings	
per	certificate	of	a	given	type	by	the	number	of	certificates	of	that	type	held	and	then	summing	
these	 three	 amounts.	 That	 is,	 (number	 of	 x-certificates	 held)	 x	 (earnings	 per	 x-certificate)	 +	
(number	of	y-certificates	held)	x	(earnings	per	y-certificate)	+	(number	of	z-certificates	held)	x	
(earnings	per	z-certificate)	=	total	certificate	earnings.	Suppose,	for	example,	that	you	hold	five	
x-certificates	 at	 the	 end	 of	 year	 1.	 If	 for	 that	 period	 your	 earnings	 are	 _____	 francs	 per	 x-
certificate	(i.e.,	the	number	for	x-certificates	from	row	19	is	____)	then	your	total	x-certificate	
earnings	in	the	year	would	be	5	x	____	=	____	francs.	Suppose	you	hold	4	y-certificates	and	3	z-
certificates	at	the	end	of	year	1.	If	for	that	period	your	earnings	are	0	francs	per	certificate	for	y-
certificates	and	z-certificates	then	your	total	y-certificate	earnings	in	the	year	would	be	4	x	0	=	0	
francs	and	your	 total	 z-certificate	earnings	 in	 the	year	would	be	3	 x	0	=	0	 francs.	 	 Your	 total	
certificate	earnings	would	be	___	+	0	+	0	=	___	francs.		This	number	should	be	recorded	on	row	
19	at	the	end	of	the	year.		
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Sales	 from	 your	 certificate	 holdings	 increase	 your	 francs	 on	 hand	 by	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 sale	
price.	 Similarly,	 purchases	 reduce	 your	 francs	 on	hand	by	 the	 amount	of	 the	purchase	price.	
Thus	you	can	gain	or	lose	money	on	the	purchase	and	resale	of	certificates.	At	the	end	of	each	
year	 all	 your	 holdings	 are	 automatically	 sold	 to	 the	 experimenter	 at	 a	 price	 of	 0.	 At	 the	
beginning	of	each	year	you	are	provided	with	an	initial	holding	of	certificates.	This	is	recorded	
on	row	0	of	the	year's	information	and	record	sheet.	You	may	sell	these	if	you	wish	or	you	may	
hold	them.	If	you	hold	a	certificate,	then	you	receive	"earnings	per	certificate"	at	the	end	of	the	
year.	
	In	addition,	at	the	beginning	of	each	year	you	are	provided	with	an	initial	amount	of	francs	on	
hand.	This	is	also	recorded	on	row	0	of	each	year's	information	and	record	sheet.	You	may	keep	
this	if	you	wish	or	you	may	use	it	to	purchase	certificates.		
Thus	at	the	beginning	of	each	year	you	are	endowed	with	holdings	of	certificates	and	francs	on	
hand.	You	are	free	to	buy	and	sell	certificates	as	you	wish	according	to	the	rules	below.	Your	
francs	on	hand	at	the	end	of	a	year	are	determined	by	your	 initial	amount	of	francs	on	hand,	
earnings	on	certificate	holdings	at	the	end	of	the	year,	and	by	gains	and	losses	from	purchases	
and	sales	of	certificates.	All	 francs	on	hand	at	the	end	of	a	year	 in	excess	of	_____	francs	are	
yours	to	keep.	These	are	your	profits	for	the	year.	
	
Information	about	Dividends		
Whether	the	dividend	you	receive	from	the	certificates	of	a	given	type	you	hold	is	the	amount	
shown	on	row	19	or	0	depends	on	the	draw	of	an	outcome	from	a	bingo	cage.		If	the	outcome	is	
x	 then	 x-certificates	 receive	 the	 x-dividend	 shown	 on	 row	 19	 while	 y-certificates	 and	 z-
certificates	each	earn	0.				If	the	outcome	is	y	then	y-certificates	receive	the	y-dividend	shown	
on	 row	 19	 while	 x-certificates	 and	 z-certificates	 each	 earn	 0.	 	 If	 the	 outcome	 is	 z	 then	 z-
certificates	receive	the	z-dividend	shown	on	row	19	while	x-certificates	and	y-certificates	each	
earn	0.	The	outcomes	were	determined	before	the	experiment	began	by	drawing	a	ball	from	a	
bingo	cage	in	a	manner	similar	to	what	was	described	earlier.			
As	a	reminder,	each	year	there	is	a	_35_%	chance	that	the	outcome	is	x;	a	_20_%	chance	that	
the	outcome	is	y;	and	a	_45_%	chance	that	the	outcome	is	z.				
At	the	beginning	of	each	year,	before	trading	starts,	each	investor	will	receive	a	clue	using	the	
clue	sheets	you	have	already	received.			
	
Trading	and	Recording	Rules		
(6) All	transactions	are	for	one	certificate	of	a	given	type	at	a	time.	After	each	of	your	sales	
or	 purchases	 you	 must	 record	 the	 TRANSACTION	 PRICE	 in	 the	 appropriate	 column	
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depending	on	the	nature	of	the	transaction.	The	first	transaction	is	recorded	on	row	(1),	
and	succeeding	transactions	are	recorded	on	subsequent	rows.	
(7) After	each	transaction	you	must	calculate	and	record	your	new	holdings	of	certificates	
and	your	new	 francs	on	hand.	Your	holdings	of	 certificates	of	any	 type	may	go	below	
zero.	Your	francs	on	hand	may	never	go	below	zero.		
(8) At	the	end	of	the	year	record	your	total	certificate	earnings	in	the	last	column	of	row	19.	
If	 you	 have	 negative	 certificate	 holdings	 of	 a	 type,	 you	 receive	 no	 dividends	 for	 that	
type,	 and	 you	must	pay	 a	penalty	of	 300	 francs	plus	 the	highest	 transaction	price	 for	
that	 type	 during	 the	 period,	 for	 each	 certificate	 you	 are	 short.	 Compute	 your	 end	 of	
period	 totals	 on	 row	 20	 by	 listing	 certificate	 holdings	 and	 adding	 total	 certificate	
earnings	to	your	francs	on	hand.	
(9) At	the	end	of	the	year,	subtract	from	your	francs	on	hand	the	amount	listed	in	row	21	
and	 enter	 this	 new	 amount	 on	 row	 22.	 This	 is	 your	 profit	 for	 the	market	 year	 and	 is	
yours	to	keep.	At	the	end	of	each	market	year,	record	this	number	on	your	profit	sheet.	
(10) At	the	end	of	the	experiment	add	up	your	total	profit	on	your	profit	sheet	and	enter	this	
sum	on	row	22	of	your	profit	sheet.	To	convert	this	number	into	dollars,	multiply	by	the	
number	on	 row	23	and	 record	 the	product	on	 row	24.	The	experimenter	will	pay	you	
this	amount	of	money.	
	
Market	organization.	−	The	market	for	these	certificates	is	organized	as	follows.	The	market	will	
be	 conducted	 in	 a	 series	 of	 years.	 Each	 period	 lasts	 for	 seven	 minutes.	 Anyone	 wishing	 to	
purchase	a	certificate	of	a	given	type	is	free	to	raise	his	or	her	hand	and	make	a	verbal	bid	to	
buy	one	certificate	of	a	given	type	at	a	specified	price,	and	anyone	with	certificates	of	the	given	
type	to	sell	is	free	to	accept	or	not	accept	the	bid.	Likewise,	anyone	wishing	to	sell	a	certificate	
of	a	given	type	is	free	to	raise	his	or	her	hand	and	make	a	verbal	offer	to	sell	one	certificate	of	a	
given	type	at	a	specified	price.	If	a	bid	or	offer	is	accepted,	a	binding	contract	has	been	closed	
for	 a	 single	 certificate,	 and	 the	 contracting	 parties	 will	 record	 the	 transaction	 on	 their	
information	 and	 record	 sheets.	 Any	 ties	 in	 bids	 or	 acceptance	 will	 be	 resolved	 by	 random	
choice.	 Except	 for	 the	 bids	 and	 their	 acceptance,	 you	 are	 not	 to	 speak	 to	 any	 other	 subject.	
There	are	likely	to	be	many	bids	that	are	not	accepted,	but	you	are	free	to	keep	trying.	You	are	
free	to	make	as	much	profit	as	you	can.	
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Name __________________________________ 
	
PROFIT SHEET 
Row Market Year Profit 
1 1  
2 2  
3 3  
4 4  
5 5  
6 6  
7 7  
8 8  
9 9  
10 10  
11 11  
12 12  
13 13  
14 14  
15 15  
16 16  
17 17  
18 18  
19 19  
20 20  
21   
22 Total profit (in francs)  
23 Dollars per franc 0.00311 
24 Total dollars profit  
																																								 																				
11	This	exchange	rate	varies	across	markets.	
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Trader No. ____ 
INFORMATION AND RECORD SHEET [Single Asset] 
YEAR _______ 
 Transaction 
Number 
Transaction Price 
Sale      Purchase 
Certificates  
on Hand 
Francs  
on Hand 
Beginning of the 
Year Holdings 0 
///////////////////// 
///////////////////// 
  
 1     
 2     
 3     
 4     
 5     
 6     
 7     
 8     
 9     
 10     
 11     
 12     
 13     
 14     
 15     
 16     
 17     
 18     
x-Dividend _____ 
 
y-Dividend _____ 
 
z-Dividend _____ 
 
19 
Total Certificate Earnings 
Dividend Rate 
on Hand at the End of the Year 
 
 20 
 
Total Francs on Hand at the 
End of the Year 
 
 21 
 Less:  Fixed Costs 
 
 22 
 End of Year Net Profit 
 
Transfer this amount 
    to your Profit Sheet 
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Trader No. ____ 
INFORMATION AND RECORD SHEET [Contingent Claims] 
YEAR ________ 
 Transaction 
Number 
Transaction Price 
Sale      Purchase 
Certificates  
on Hand 
x   y   z 
Francs  
on Hand 
Beginning of the 
Year Holdings 0 
///////////////////// 
/////////////////////     
 1       
 2       
 3       
 4       
 5       
 6       
 7       
 8       
 9       
 10       
 11       
 12       
 13       
 14       
 15       
 16       
 17       
 18       
x-Dividend _____ 
  
y-Dividend _____ 
 
z-Dividend _____ 
 
19 
    Total Certificate Earnings 
    Dividend Rate 
    on Hand at the End of the Year 
 
 20 
 
    Total Francs on Hand at the 
    End of the Year  
 21 
     Less:  Fixed Costs  
 22 
     End of Year Net Profit  
    Transfer this amount 
    to your Profit Sheet 
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Demonstration	of	Market	[Single	Asset]	
We	will	now	go	through	a	demonstration	of	how	the	market	will	work.	
The	auctioneer	will	announce	the	market	is	open.	
Suppose	 that	Trader	13	wants	 to	offer	 to	buy	a	certificate	at	a	price	of	25.	 	Trader	13	would	
raise	 her	 paddle	 and	 the	 auctioneer	 would	 call	 on	 her	 saying	 something	 like	 “Trader	 13.”		
Trader	13	would	then	respond	with	“Bid	of	25.”	The	auctioneer	will	repeat	the	order:	“Trader	
13	Bids	25.”		This	will	be	recorded	on	the	board.		[The	order	is	marked	on	the	board.]			
Now	 suppose	 that	 Trader	14	wants	 to	offer	 to	 sell	 a	 certificate	 at	 a	price	of	 500.	 	 Trader	14	
should	raise	his	paddle.	 	When	the	auctioneer	calls	on	Trader	14,	Trader	14	should	announce	
“Ask	500.”		The	auctioneer	will	repeat	“Trader	14	Asks	500.”	This	will	then	be	recorded	on	the	
board.	[The	order	is	marked	on	the	board.]			
This	process	will	continue	as	long	as	someone	wants	to	improve	on	the	currently	standing	bid	
or	ask	or	accept	the	standing	bid	or	ask.		For	example,	Trader	13	may	raise	her	paddle	and	after	
being	called	state	“Bid	of	100.”		The	auctioneer	will	repeat	“Trader	13	Bids	100”	and	this	will	be	
marked	on	the	board.		[The	order	is	marked	on	the	board.]		Notice	that	you	can	improve	upon	
your	own	bid	or	ask.	
If	Trader	15	 is	willing	to	sell	at	100,	 the	current	standing	bid,	Trader	15	can	raise	her	paddle.		
When	called	upon	Trader	15	will	state	“Accept	Bid	100.”	The	auctioneer	will	repeat	that	“Trader	
15	Accepts	Bid	of	100.”		At	this	point	Trader	13	and	15	have	traded	a	single	certificate	and	this	
will	 be	 reflected	 on	 the	 board	 by	 circling	 the	 accepted	 bid.	 	 [Circle	 the	 accepted	 bid	 on	 the	
board	and	write	Trader	15	on	the	line	as	the	seller.]				
Trader	13	will	record	on	her	Information	and	Record	sheet	that	she	purchased	a	certificate	by	
writing	the	price	in	the	Purchase	column	in	the	row	corresponding	to	Transaction	1.		 	She	will	
then	update	her	Certificates	on	Hand	and	Francs	on	Hand.	 	Similarly,	Trader	15	will	record	on	
her	 Information	 and	 Record	 sheet	 that	 she	 sold	 a	 certificate	 by	writing	 the	 price	 in	 the	 Sale	
column	 in	 the	 row	corresponding	 to	Transaction	1.	 	 	 She	will	 then	update	her	Certificates	on	
Hand	and	Francs	on	Hand.		
A	 line	will	be	drawn	across	the	market	record	on	the	board	 indicating	that	all	of	the	previous	
bids	and	asks	are	no	longer	available.	The	auctioneer	will	then	invite	new	bids	or	asks.	
Trader	13	may	state	an	Ask	of	600.	
Trader	14	may	state	an	Ask	of	542.	
Trader	16	may	state	a	Bid	of	33.	
Trader	17	may	state	a	Bid	of	35.	
Trader	16	may	state	a	bid	of	40.	
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Trader	17	may	state	a	Bid	of	60.	
Trader	14	may	state	an	Ask	500.	
Trader	15	may	Accept	the	Bid	of	60.		
At	 this	 point,	 the	 bid	 of	 60	 is	 circled	 and	 Traders	 17	 would	 record	 the	 price	 of	 60	 under	
Purchase	in	the	row	for	Transaction	1.	 	Trader	17	would	then	update	his	Certificates	on	Hand	
and	 Francs	 on	Hand.	Notice	 that	 for	 Trader	 15	 this	would	 be	her	 second	 transaction,	 so	 she	
would	record	the	Sale	price	on	the	row	for	Transaction	2	and	then	update	the	remainder	of	the	
row.	
A	 line	will	be	drawn	across	the	market	record	on	the	board	 indicating	that	all	of	the	previous	
bids	and	asks	are	no	longer	available	and	the	auctioneer	will	again	invite	new	bids	or	asks.		This	
process	continues	until	7	minutes	have	passed	at	which	point	no	more	bids,	asks,	or	acceptance	
can	be	made.		
Suppose	there	are	no	more	transactions	involving	Trader	15	in	the	market	year.		If	the	state	is	Y,	
given	 the	 fictitious	 values	 in	 this	 example,	 Trader	 15	 would	 complete	 their	 Information	 and	
Record	Sheet	as	follows:	
Total	Certificate	Earnings	in	Row	19	would	be:	 8	*	100	=	800	
Total	Francs	on	Hand	in	Row	20	would	be:	 20,160	
End	of	Year	Net	Profit	in	Row	22	would	be:		 800	+	20,160	–	20,000	=	960.	
				
	 	
	 	 	
	
47	
	
Demonstration	of	Market	[Contingent	Claims]	
We	will	now	go	through	a	demonstration	of	how	the	market	will	work.	
The	auctioneer	will	announce	the	market	is	open.	
Suppose	that	Trader	13	wants	to	offer	to	buy	an	X	certificate	at	a	price	of	25.		Trader	13	would	
raise	 her	 paddle	 and	 the	 auctioneer	 would	 call	 on	 her	 saying	 something	 like	 “Trader	 13.”		
Trader	 13	would	 then	 respond	with	 “Bid	 on	 X	 of	 25.”	 The	 auctioneer	will	 repeat	 the	 order:	
“Trader	13	Bid	on	X	of	25.”	 	This	will	be	recorded	on	the	board.	 	[The	order	is	marked	on	the	
board.]			
Now	suppose	that	Trader	14	wants	to	offer	to	sell	an	X	certificate	at	a	price	of	500.		Trader	14	
should	raise	his	paddle.	 	When	the	auctioneer	calls	on	Trader	14,	Trader	14	should	announce	
“Ask	for	X	of	500.”	 	The	auctioneer	will	repeat	“Trader	14	Ask	for	X	of	500.”	This	will	then	be	
recorded	on	the	board.	[The	order	is	marked	on	the	board.]			
This	process	will	continue	as	long	as	someone	wants	to	improve	on	the	currently	standing	bid	
or	ask	or	accept	the	standing	bid	or	ask.		For	example,	Trader	13	may	raise	her	paddle	and	after	
being	called	state	“Bid	on	X	of	100.”		The	auctioneer	will	repeat	“Trader	13	Bid	on	X	of	100”	and	
this	will	 be	marked	on	 the	board.	 	 [The	order	 is	marked	on	 the	board.]	 	Notice	 that	 you	can	
improve	upon	your	own	bid	or	ask.	
If	Trader	15	is	willing	to	sell	X	at	100,	the	current	standing	bid,	Trader	15	can	raise	her	paddle.		
When	called	upon	Trader	15	will	state	“Accept	Bid	on	X	of	100.”	The	auctioneer	will	repeat	that	
“Trader	 15	Accepts	Bid	on	X	of	 100.”	 	At	 this	 point	 Trader	 13	 and	15	have	 traded	a	 single	X	
certificate	 and	 this	 will	 be	 reflected	 on	 the	 board	 by	 circling	 the	 accepted	 bid.	 	 [Circle	 the	
accepted	bid	on	the	board	and	write	Trader	15	on	the	line	as	the	seller.]				
Trader	13	will	record	on	her	Information	and	Record	sheet	that	she	purchased	an	X	certificate	
by	writing	the	price	in	the	Purchase	column	in	the	row	corresponding	to	Transaction	1.			She	will	
then	update	her	Certificates	on	Hand	and	Francs	on	Hand.	 	Similarly,	Trader	15	will	record	on	
her	Information	and	Record	sheet	that	she	sold	an	X	certificate	by	writing	the	price	in	the	Sale	
column	 in	 the	 row	corresponding	 to	Transaction	1.	 	 	 She	will	 then	update	her	Certificates	on	
Hand	and	Francs	on	Hand.		
A	line	will	be	drawn	across	the	X	market	record	on	the	board	indicating	that	all	of	the	previous	
bids	and	asks	for	X	certificates	are	no	longer	available.	The	auctioneer	will	then	invite	new	bids	
or	asks.	
Trader	13	may	state	an	Ask	for	X	of	600.	
Trader	14	may	state	an	Ask	for	Y	of	542.	
Trader	17	may	state	a	Bid	on	Y	of	35	
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Trader	16	may	state	a	Bid	on	X	of	33.	
Trader	16	may	state	a	bid	on	X	of	40.	
Trader	17	may	state	a	Bid	on	Y	of	60.	
Trader	14	may	state	an	Ask	on	X	for	500.	
Trader	15	may	Accept	the	Bid	on	Y	of	60.		
At	 this	point,	 the	bid	of	60	 for	Y	 is	 circled	and	Trader	17	would	 record	 the	price	of	60	under	
Purchase	 in	the	row	for	Transaction	1.	 	Trader	17	would	then	update	all	of	his	Certificates	on	
Hand	and	Francs	on	Hand.	Notice	that	for	Trader	15	this	would	be	her	second	transaction,	so	
she	would	record	the	Sale	price	on	the	row	for	Transaction	2	and	then	update	the	remainder	of	
the	row.	
A	 line	 will	 be	 drawn	 across	 the	 market	 record	 for	 Y	 on	 the	 board	 indicating	 that	 all	 of	 the	
previous	bids	and	asks	 for	Y	are	no	 longer	available	and	 the	auctioneer	will	 again	 invite	new	
bids	or	asks.		Notice	that	the	bids	and	asks	for	X	are	still	available.		This	process	continues	until	
7	minutes	have	passed	at	which	point	no	more	bids,	asks,	or	acceptance	can	be	made.			
Suppose	there	are	no	more	transactions	involving	Trader	15	in	the	market	year.		If	the	state	is	Y,	
given	 the	 fictitious	 values	 in	 this	 example,	 Trader	 15	 would	 complete	 their	 Information	 and	
Record	Sheet	as	follows:	
Total	Certificate	Earnings	in	Row	19	would	be:	 9	*	0	+	9	*	100	+	10	*	0	=	900	
Total	Francs	on	Hand	in	Row	20	would	be:	 20,160	
End	of	Year	Net	Profit	in	Row	22	would	be:		 900	+	20,160	–	20,000	=	1,060.	
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Appendix	C.	Additional	findings		
	
Table	C1.		Com
parison	of	Actual	Prices	to	Prices	Predicted	by	Three	M
odels	at	the	End	of	Each	M
arket	for	Sessions	w
ith	Experienced	
Traders	(M
arkets	5	and	8)	
	
M
AD	
Log	O
dds	U
nder	N
orm
ality	
Percentage	of	Convergent	Price	
Changes	
	
	
	
	PI	
		RE	
M
M
	
PI	
		RE	
M
M
	
PI	
				RE	
M
M
	
W
ilcoxon	Signed	Ranked	Sum
	
Tests	
			↑_____↑	
			↓	
↑______↑	
								↓	
		↑______↑	
↓	
↑______↑	
↓	
											↑_______↑	
									↓	
↑________↑	
													↓	
All	Sessions	
29	
0.124(PI)	
25	
0.327(RE)	
23	
0.484(PI)	
30	
0.093(RE)	
30	
0.079(RE)	
26	
0.262(RE)	
Reported	m
etrics	for	each	session	are	based	on	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	X,	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Y,	and	the	last	period	in	
w
hich	the	state	w
as	Z.		Each	statistical	test	com
pares	RE	to	an	alternative	m
odel.		Each	cell	in	the	low
er	portion	of	the	table	contains	the	associated	test	
statistic	and	level	of	significance	as	w
ell.		The	m
odel	in	parentheses	is	the	one	favored	by	the	data.		This	table	is	com
parable	to	Table	III	in	Plott	and	Sunder	
(1988).			
	
	
	
	
	
50	
	
Table	C2.		Com
parison	of	Actual	Allocations	w
ith	the	Allocations	Predicted	by	Three	M
odels	
Criterion:	Percent	of	Predicted	Flow
	of	Securities	that	Actually	O
ccurred	at	the	End	of	Each	M
arket	
for	Sessions	w
ith	Experienced	Traders	(M
arkets	5	and	8)	
	
M
odels	
												PI	
											RE	
M
M
	
W
ilcoxon	Rank	Sum
	Tests	
												↑___________↑	
																				↓	
↑___________↑	
																				↓	
All	Sessions	
39	
0.027(RE)	
24	
0.083(M
M
)	
Reported	m
etrics	for	each	session	are	based	on	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	X,	the	last	
period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Y,	and	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Z,	as	applicable.		Each	
statistical	test	com
pares	RE	to	an	alternative	m
odel.		Each	cell	in	the	low
er	portion	of	the	table	
contains	the	associated	test	statistic	and	level	of	significance	as	w
ell.		The	m
odel	in	parentheses	is	the	
one	favored	by	the	data	based	on	the	m
edian.		This	table	is	com
parable	to	Table	IV	in	Plott	and	Sunder	
(1988).		How
ever,	P&
S	report	that	a	W
ilcoxon	Signed	Rank	Sum
	Test	is	used,	but	that	test	is	not	
defined	for	any	com
parison	betw
een	RE	and	another	m
odel	except	for	a	test	betw
een	PI	and	RE	in	
Series-B	M
arkets.		The	test	statistic	for	such	a	test	w
ould	be	0	based	on	our	data	w
ith	a	p-value	of	
0.012	w
ith	the	data	favoring	RE.							
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Table	C3.		Com
parison	of	Actual	Distribution	of	Profits	to	Distribution	Predicted	by	Three	M
odels	
Criterion:	Squared	Sum
	of	Deviations	from
	the	M
ean	Across	Investors	at	the	End	of	Each	M
arket	
for	Sessions	w
ith	Experienced	Traders	(M
arkets	5	and	8)	
	
M
odels	
	
	
	
					PI	
RE	
	M
M
	
W
ilcoxon	Signed	Ranked	Sum
	
Tests	
						↑_________↑	
														↓	
↑_________↑	
														↓	
All	Sessions	
32	
0.050(RE)	
19	
0.889(RE)	
Reported	m
etrics	for	each	session	are	based	on	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	X,	
the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Y,	and	the	last	period	in	w
hich	the	state	w
as	Z,	as	
applicable.		Each	statistical	test	com
pares	RE	to	an	alternative	m
odel.		Each	cell	in	the	
low
er	portion	of	the	table	contains	the	associated	test	statistic	and	level	of	significance	
as	w
ell.		The	m
odel	in	parentheses	is	the	one	favored	by	the	data.		This	table	is	
com
parable	to	Table	V	in	Plott	and	Sunder	(1988).			
				
